THE 1953 HARTAL: LESSONS FOR TODAY?

Why Discuss the Hartal Today?

-- G. Rodrigo

The Hartal was undoubtedly the high point of mass struggle in Sri Lanka. Some people want to commemorate this landmark event to indulge in nostalgia or even political 'ancestor worship.' This contribution argues that the Hartal deserves more serious evaluation as a defining moment in the evolution of the Left movement in Sri Lanka. It may also cast some light on the political challenges for the Left today, if 'what is left of the Left' is able to stagger out of the opium den of historical nostalgia and face the real world.

Revolutionists ritually condemned the LSSP leadership for not having 'taken power' at the height of the Hartal and inaugurating a socialist regime. This is the view of revolutionary formalists, or more accurately revolutionary formulists. They argued for the immediate overthrow of capitalist societies everywhere whether nascent or mature in the mistaken belief that the world was ripe for socialist revolution everywhere. They did not stop to ask whether the societies in question, some of which were barely emerging from various pre-capitalist levels, were ready for socialism or for even fairly basic capitalism. As a result a whole range of grotesque regimes emerged, the Pol-Pot regime in Cambodia, Mengistu in Ethiopia, the Kim dynasty in North Korea and so on.

Formulists also see revolution as replicating the basic sequences of their favourite revolution, the Russian, the Chinese or Cuban as the case may be. For enthusiasts of the Russian Revolution the steps are as follows: serious social contradiction leads to the collapse of the existing order; then ensues a struggle between the bolshevik left and the forces of a nascent capitalist order consisting of bourgeois groupings supported by the soft, non-bolshevik left. The momentum is initially with the former, but then the reactionary 'Kornilovist' forces intervene to restore the defunct regime, thereby decisively shifting the initiative to the bolsheviks. The latter then go on to defeat not only Kornilov but also the infant social democracy.

Enthusiasts of the Chinese revolution built their strategy around a Red Army and liberated areas which surround the cities and eventually subjugate them. I once came across a Maoist group that was advocating this strategy in the USA as well. After the success of the Cuban revolution that strategy was all the rage, for a while at least. Inevitably, people who are disgusted by the venality of existing political systems will search around for political strategies to achieve a better order. It is also inevitable that simple 'tried and tested' strategies will appeal most to activists. Because of the simple analyses of society presented and the relatively straightforward solutions offered, such strategies will have the greatest popular appeal, as in the case of the JVP in Sri Lanka. But after half a century of disappointment, it is surely time to think more seriously, to return to rigorous social and political analysis, in formulating a way forward?

It is natural to strategize in terms of historical formulas when one is young and inexperienced.  I used to think in formulistic terms, when I started to reflect on political theory in the first years. The point about raising this issue for a Hartal commemoration is to show that political strategy is influenced by our interpretation of political history. As regards my own adherence to formulistic interpretations, the answer is clear. Not having adequate knowledge of recent history and lacking experience is social science analysis, the only anchor available was the writings of the classical Marxists. Like a person who cannot swim, I clung on to the lifebelt of 'Marxist theory' derived from Lenin and Trotsky; this was understandable but inadequate. For those who cannot swim, a lifebelt - an inflatable tube - is useful for floating in water.

But past formulas are not a good guide to present action. You have to work out guidelines from the present 'correlation of forces.' That is what real Marxism is about. It is particularly important for Marxists who recognize that everything is in constant dialectical change, to rework political guidelines in each new period. Lenin himself  decisively rejected the 'grey theory' of the past in favour of the 'eternally green tree of life' when his past formulas were thrown at him by younger, inexperienced formulists in this own party. Floating in the water by means of a lifebelt is not at all the same thing as swimming; once you learn to swim, a lifebelt is actually an obstruction that you want to discard quickly. Dogmatic adherence to past strategies is not Marxist theorizing at all but exercises is scholasticism, similar to that of medieval theologians. The tragedy is there are too many who still confuse Marxist scholasticism with real theorizing.

The Hartal: one side of the broader social crisis

Now let me turn to the Hartal after that brief digression. The events leading up to the 1953 Hartal were certainly a crisis for the UNP government, newly set up under British patronage. The Hartal was the manifestation of one aspect of a broader social crisis faced by Sri Lanka in the immediate aftermath of Independence. It signified the need for economic regeneration, the need to break out of the colonial production and export pattern. The other aspect of the social crisis was the rising dissatisfaction of the non-Westernized masses with their de-facto exclusion from participation in the political and economic processes inherited from the British-UNP deal. This led to an upsurge of the 'Sinhala-Buddhist' and Tamil nationalist forces, directed against the establishment.

The Hartal generated a breakdown of public order through a mass uprising. But it was nowhere near on the same scale as the catastrophic failure of Tsarism in 1917 Russia. The leaders of the Left leaders made no attempt to 'seize state power' since they did not have such an objective. Despite immediate welfare cuts, the country was still prosperous, the Sri Lankan armed forces and the British forces at hand, supported the government and the forces of the left were of course completely unprepared for insurrection. I do not think it would have possible to seize power as in the Russian or any other revolution.

Nevertheless, I suggest here that the Left leaders missed a critical opportunity to take the political struggle forward. The forces of Sinhala nationalism seeking a solution to their problems turned away from the Left towards Bandaranaike who led them on to the 1956 victory of the SLFP. The policies pursued by this government then went on to inflame Tamil nationalism which eventually led to the armed struggle of Tamil militants against the state. From then on no government, of the SLFP or the UNP, were able to resolve the National Question or launch a sustainable programme of economic development. Sri Lanka in 1953 was a model that Singapore wanted to emulate. But fifty years later our living standards have barely risen, whereas Singapore along with Hong Kong,  South Korea and Taiwan have gone on to achieve first world status. It is not possible to avoid the conclusion that political failure at a fundamental level is responsible for a 50 years of stagnation.

The Hartal viewed from today's vantage point

I will make a simpler and more precise argument and attempt to connect the failure of 1953-1956 to the present dilemma for the Left and the Right in Sri Lanka today. Given the complete failure of all 'socialist states' to take their societies forward in the face of competition from capitalist states in general, it is difficult to see how the Left would have succeeded with a similar strategy. Let me clarify the point. Post colonial societies moved in broadly two directions. Some following the example of Russia and China attempted to rebuild their nations as planned economies. Others promoted the public sector as necessary for fast economic development, while allowing space for capitalism, like India, but with highly protected markets. Nether of these strategies succeeded as we know well now. Despite its early export orientation, Sri Lanka followed the second strategy, but also without success.

Even the partial nationalization of the commanding heights of the economy in subsequent periods led not to prosperity but to a deepening of economic and political crises, as evidenced by the JVP insurrections of 1971 and beyond. A large number of developing countries attempted to construct economic prosperity by expanding the public sector to make up for the weaknesses of domestic entrepreneurs and by shielding domestic economies against foreign competition. Such 'inward oriented' policies have not really succeeded anywhere and since the late 1980s most economies have re-oriented economic policy along the East Asian export-promotion model. As I pointed out in a recent Sunday Observer article, only export-oriented East Asian economies have succeeded in significantly expanding the domestic market and raising living standards. In the light of this experience we have to re-evaluate the feasibility of the 'revolutionary option' in 1953.

My argument is that the Hartal resulted from the weakness of the economy, of the production and trade patterns inherited from the colonial period. It was highly vulnerable to abrupt changes in a few key commodities. That was why the government was forced to sharply raise prices thereby triggering mass discontent. As early as 1953 the Hartal signalled a need for a complete economic revitalization spearheaded by an aggressive expansion of industry, employing the full resources of the private and public sectors. Unlike most countries Sri Lanka was already an export-oriented economy with much of the infrastructure for expanding exports. Neither the Left nor the UNP at that time drew this conclusion. Instead they focussed on the purely political manifestation of the social crisis, the upsurge of Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism, which undermined political support for both the Left and the UNP.

When the Korean war ended in 1953, South Korea was much poorer than Sri Lanka. The industry inherited from the colonial period was mostly in the North, under the Kim Il Sung regime. At that time nobody thought South Korea a better prospect than Sri Lanka. Yet it followed a path of state promoted industrialization with strong focus on external markets which compelled its companies to acquire technology rapidly. Today South Korea is an industrial giant. No Sri Lankan party had anything like the single-minded dedication to industrial development that was seen in Korea and Taiwan. Extensive research has now established that these industrializing impulses were largely home-grown. In Taiwan, the Chiang Kai Shek regime was driven by the desire to win back China and President Park, was inspired by Japan and wanted to emulate its example.

The Hartal and the nationalist upsurge

Given that the UNP of that time was based on utterly reactionary landed elements and comprador business interests, it is no surprise that they had no idea about the need to industrialize and build up the economy. Having being created and nurtured by the British Raj, their 'vision' was limited by their pathological subservience to the neo-colonial system. By 1977, Jayawardena had arrived at an understanding of the need for rapid economic growth, but had no idea on how to promote it. Thus enormous funds were expended on the Mahaweli project, but very little by comparison on building up the social and physical infrastructure that would encourage industrial investment. In the post-1977 period as well, the UNP leaders were political pygmies compared to Park of South Korea and Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore, as aptly documented by the latter in his autobiography.

It is no exaggeration to say that the LSSP leaders were giants by comparison. Yet the Left was riven by two internecine conflicts in that period. The first was the inevitable chasm between the followers of Stalin and the independent socialist in the LSSP. The second was the acrimonious struggle between the egotistic Philip Gunawardane and the disciplined section of the leadership. Philip was focussed on the agrarian question and was naturally drawn into the SLFP as a junior partner. The LSSP itself probably recognized the need for strong industrial development, but only by sidelining the nascent industrial class by means of a comprehensive planned economy. Having associated capitalism with imperialism and its semi-feudal lackeys, they could not do otherwise.

The inconclusive ending of the Hartal surely provided a powerful boost to the SLFP. On the one hand the weakness of the UNP regime was revealed. On the other, the Left allowed the energy of the Hartal to dissipate without proposing radical solutions to the economic and political problems of the day. The UNP and the SLFP stumbled into 'Sinhala Only' policies, thereby reviving the fire of Tamil nationalism. We have to recognize that the LSSP was in a difficult position. They could not abandon their position on language, nor their defence of the recently disfranchised plantation workers of Indian origin. Inevitably they lost ground in this nationalistic upsurge. They also lost a substantial number of activists who decrying the 'dogmatism' of the top leadership went over to function as the SLFP's left wing.

Eventually the LSSP majority itself succumbed to the electoral power of the SLFP and its ability to project itself as the leader of the struggle against the UNP and its international backers.  They abandoned their position on language, implicitly giving up their support of the democratic rights of minorities. The LSSP still remains deeply embedded within the SLFP. Almost 40 years after the inception of this strategy, nothing of value has resulted from this embrace of nationalism. In fact the LSSP today is a shadow of its formidable presence in 1953.

Five major challenges, a half-century later

Fifty years after the Hartal, the challenge for Sri Lanka is tragically still the same, in very general terms at least.  The political system has to be expanded to accommodate the democratic rights of minorities, not to the extent perceived in the 1950s, but to what is deemed minimal today in the light of a half-century of world developments. The other major challenge is the re-generation of an internationally competitive economy which will match growth rates in the most successful regions of East Asia and thereby raise living standards rapidly in all sections of society. As in the political aspect, the strategies and technologies that will address the economic challenge will be very different from what they were in the 1953 period. The sad part is that so little has been done over the last 50 years. The encouraging part is that today we have a much clearer idea of what needs to be done in both areas and there is much broader readiness to embrace radical solutions.

Having written about the economic challenges elsewhere, I will conclude by listing the political challenges faced by the Left in Sri Lanka, at this critical time in the progress of the peace process. It is manifestly obvious of course, that even a good settlement will not work unless it is followed by an extended period - at least a decade - of rapid economic growth. This is necessary to absorb demobilized militants and soldiers in income-generating activity and to raise optimism all round in the long-term viability of cooperative coexistence. Since rapid economic growth is also out of the question without an enduring political settlement, it is clear that these two broad challenges, the same that Sri Lanka faced in the time of the Hartal, are symbiotically linked. The word used here 'symbiosis' is drawn from evolutionary biology. For old-fashioned Marxists, it has the same connotation as 'dialectical,' indicating mutual causality or dynamic inter-dependence.

The first and most fundamental task is to start thinking seriously and realistically about what is possible for the Left today. This means abandoning romantic revolutionism and political action based on formulas drawn from historical struggles. Some of these formulas are a hundred years out of date. All ideology is supposed to economize on thinking about how to respond to practical questions. For the Left, it is sadly true that ideology has served as a substitute for thinking at all. No amount of mastery of the Marxist classics can make up for lack of real knowledge about the realities of political and economic relationships at the present time. Through numerous letters and documents over the last 15 years, I have tried to explain what this means in real terms.

Deriving from the above approach, the second challenge is to realistically assess economic and political prospects. The attempt to set up socialism through planned economies in less developed countries, has been an unmitigated disaster. In most cases, such regimes have represented a shift, not forward from ineffective capitalism, but backward to medieval authoritarianism with all of the trappings of medieval kings. In some power has passed from father to son. In the end these regimes have proved historically unviable. In Sri Lanka the best outcome for working people in the towns and villages, is a development of capitalism like in South Korea or Taiwan. As I have argued elsewhere, this is difficult, but possible. Further it is entirely consistent with winning the best economic and political terms for working people and various minorities. Unfortunately there are still Left leaders who mechanically call for 'socialism' as if there was a possibility of mobilizing society on this basis and setting up socialist societies in backward countries.

Once you accept the above, then the third challenge is to study capitalism today in its different manifestations and to develop a realistic theory of international power relations. Capitalism is a social system that exists in many different forms, evolves through time and attempts to reproduce itself.  Let me repeat this point, capitalism is a social system and not just a conspiracy, but all the analysis we get from our Left leaders is a variety of conspiracy theories. This is clearly because they have not developed the capacity to analyse its internal logic at depth, like what Marx might do if he were around today. This requires extensive study of economic, social and political issues and is clearly a task for a few theorists. We need in particular to study why some countries are successful and others are not, in tapping into capitalist entrepreneurial dynamism. There surely are shocking inequities in the exercise of global power by the US and other rich countries, but these cannot be captured by half-digested formulas from Lenin's theory of a long superceded system of past imperialism. This is not just a theoretical issue. We need to understand how the system works, so as to mobilize internal and international political coalitions to change rules in favour of nations struggling to survive in the face of contemporary globalization. 'Goni-billa' formulas of imperialism are no substitute for solid analyses of  present economic and political relations. Just to illustrate this point, consider the most powerful weapon the US deploys to bring Europe, Japan, Russia and China into supporting its policies. It is access to the giant US market and technologies developed in the US. What has this power got in common with imperialism of Lenin's era based on military power and exploitation of unskilled labour and raw materials?

The fourth challenge is to cooperate with dynamic, forward elements of the business community  in creating and modernizing the institutions of a modern, democratic capitalist society. These do not exist now; the UNP, SLFP and their supporters have proved incapable of making progress here. Some might think, who are these 'progressive elements,' we have not seen them anywhere? That is a good question; trade union leaders deal with bosses of big companies who are mostly of the old, comprador type, inured in the old ways of repressing the working class. Most of the type of business persons I am talking about are younger; they are in small, entrepreneurial companies and you do not meet them in the normal course, because their employees are not often unionized. Nowhere in the history of capitalism has the big bourgeoisie been supportive of radical reform, which has been carried through mainly by relatively independent political groups, in the teeth of opposition from the entrenched groups that have adapted nicely to the old, reactionary system. This can be seen most clearly in India today, in the fight of modernizing entrepreneurs against the resistance of the old guard businessmen steeped in the corruption-ridden system of the past.

Finally, the fifth and most pressing challenge is to break from present subservience to nationalist forces, both Sinhala and Tamil. What I am proposing is the setting up of an independent social democratic movement based on industrial workers and the urban middle classes. As capitalism develops there is a crucial role for such a political formation, one that is guaranteed by history to carry out the tasks outlined in the previous paragraph. Though it is necessary to cooperate with progressive business elements, it is emphatically not by submerging our interests in  amorphous political alliances with nationalist forces. This is unfortunately what the LSSP leaders are doing. Once a dynamic social democracy begins to show its mettle, I suspect that radical elements of the SLFP will join it before the LSSP itself finds it expedient to leave the warm maternal embrace of Sinhala nationalism. The LSSP and  NSSP have not understood the inevitable dialectic of such movements. While they initially take forward the democratic aspirations of their constituencies, once they achieve a measure of success they turn reactionary. The SLFP degenerated into another patronage-based party inimical to national minorities. The LTTE too, on the threshold of political success has turned even more quickly into a repressive instrument of terror against nascent Tamil Democracy. The role of the NSSP in providing 'left cover' for the atrocities of the LTTE is even more incomprehensible than the determination of the LSSP to stay submerged in the SLFP. Until the NSSP & LSSP are able to distance themselves from nationalist forces, while supporting the democratic rights of all communities, there will be no resurgence of the Left. I assume that it is even more difficult for the JVP to meet this challenge, but why expect them to do something that the NSSP and the LSSP cannot do? The associated theoretical challenge is to understand the evanescent character of all political formations based on communal identities that will be quickly superceded by an expanding industrial capitalism.

Though broadly the same as in 1953, the five major challenges faced by the Left today demand far more mobilization of intellectual and political effort. While commemorating the half-century anniversary of the Hartal, it is worth pondering whether we have the capacity and the courage to face up to the political challenges of the present.