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Defining Political Killings -- Ahilan
Kadirgamar The ceasefire
in Lanka may have brought greater mobility and opened some channels
of communication into the North and East, but as argued in numerous
articles both in lines and elsewhere, it has not ended the culture
of killings. Particularly
within the Tamil community, it has been a peace without peace of
mind, as a culture of fear has eclipsed the community. Such fear is a product of killings; these killings
are not arbitrary or indiscriminate, as killings are often in a
time war. Rather these killings
are targeted, calculated and linked to threats and intimidations
with the purpose of silencing dissent through a culture of fear
and changing the political landscape of the Tamil community. The
nature of these killings is such that one killing silences hundreds
if not thousands. Looking
at the killings themselves, one may wonder if these are political
killings. After all, the hundreds that have been targeted
and killed are of many different backgrounds. Some are members of
political parties such as the EPDP or TNA, others have been journalists
or academics, and they are obviously targeted for their political
convictions and affiliations. But
there are other categories of individuals targeted.
There are the former members of the LTTE or rival factions
as well as Tamils working with the military.
These killings of individuals who are part of armed groups
or institutions are not considered as individuals with political
interests in the popular mind but rather, their status as “soldiers”
or “fighters” somehow make them fair game. Then there is the third
category of those targeted, which are the most puzzling: those who
have been labeled “social enemies,” including sex workers, gamblers,
drug users and smugglers etc. For the
time being, focusing on the LTTE and the Tamil community, I am not
looking at attacks on members of the Muslim community or members
of the Sinhala community. This is because the killings of Muslims, Sinhalese
and non-Tamils in the armed forces have a different political function.
That is to exclude and separate the Tamils from the other
communities; where as the killings within the Tamil community have
more of a role of producing a climate of fear and a culture of “traitors”
to cripple dissent within the Tamil community. Most people in the South and the international
community fail to or refuse to recognize this particular dynamic
within the Tamil community. They
are all too comfortable with dismissing the killings as insignificant
to the Tamil community or as merely a problem for the Tamil community,
which again is a product of a politics of exclusion, where by the
issues facing members of another community are not considered one’s
own problem. And in the case of the international community
and particularly the Norwegian “peace-makers,” a colonial mentality
reigns that sees these killings as inherent to a Third World armed
culture not worthy of their concern and attention.
Returning
then to the killings within the Tamil community, questions often
arise as to whether all these killings can be considered political
killings. Some would argue
that the victims of these killings were not targeted for their politics
and political positions and hence, the killings are not political
killings per se. The killings
of “anti-social” elements are considered a strong case for not lumping
all victims as victims of political killings.
Some international human rights groups themselves would be
reluctant to take up the cases of some victims, claiming that they
are combatants and are not strictly protected by international human
rights and humanitarian law. I would argue that it is not only the politics
of the victim that should determine if a targeted killings is a
political killing but also the motive of the perpetrators and the
political force behind the killing.
Here it should be noted that the timing and the character
of the killing of “anti-social” elements by the LTTE’s death squads
such as the Ellalan Force, which interestingly claims responsibility
for its killings, is to sow fear in the Tamil community.
To remind both social and political traitors, as well as
the larger Tamil society that elimination is always an option for
the LTTE when dissent is on the rise. In other words, killings that attempt to change
the political landscape of a community should be considered political
killings and resisted strongly through political means. Such political killings are not merely a law
and order problem, but rather should be the primary political issue
facing the community; for such killings also determine the political
possibilities of that community.
The continuity of political killings then is the anti-thesis
of a peace with democracy. Eduardo
Galeano records the attitude towards “traitors” in an interview
with the populist dictator Peron shortly before his return to power
in In
“Do
you know how the Chinese kill sparrows? They don’t let them rest
on the tree branches. They harass them with sticks and don’t let
them land, until the birds die in the air; their hearts give out,
and they fall to the ground. Traitors fly like sparrows. It’s enough
to harass them, to prevent them from resting, to bring them down.
No, No… To lead men you have to fly like an eagle, not a sparrow.
Leading men is a technique, an art. It requires military precision.
You have to let the traitors fly, but without letting them rest.
And wait for When
the time came, when Peronism returned to power, it fell to pieces.
It disintegrated slowly before the caudillo
[i]
died. ‘Days and Nights of Love and War’ by Eduardo Galeano (pg.
24) Unfortunately,
in the Lankan Tamil context and particularly during the span of
the last three years of the ceasefire, the so called progressives
in the South and large sections of the international community have
chosen the side of the eagles and those who control
[i]
caudillo – as defined by the
Columbia Encyclopedia, Sixth Edition:
(kôdēl´yō Span. kouthē´yō), [Span.,
= military strongman], type of South American political leader
that arose with the 19th-century wars of independence. The first
caudillos were often generals who, leading private armies, used
their military might to achieve power in the newly independent
states. Many were large landowners (hacendados) who sought to
advance their private interests. They had in common military skill
and a personal magnetism capable of commanding the allegiance
of the masses. Caudillos were not associated with particular ideologies
or political philosophies. Although they often began their career
by opposing the oligarchy, they almost invariably became oligarchs
and rarely upset the existing social order. In power, their authority
was largely unchecked. Caudillos, or caudilhos in Portuguese-speaking
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