Conflict Resolution: Politics of Peace Talks- A Response to
Editorial
-- Haisen Dev
In your editorial of the August issue, you expose the fallacy
in any assumption that the negotiating process we are witnessing
is politically neutral and unbiased. Bias is inherent in almost
any negotiations. In fact any closed door negotiations may undermine
democratic institutions such as parliament and should be resorted
to only in crises situations which the democratic system is unable
to cope with; even in such circumstance, the scope of the negotiation
should be limited to issues of immediate relevance to the resolution
of the crisis. Thus there may be a need for closed door negotiations
on issues critical to the ending of the civil war, but not on
the apportionment of the national budget or the drafting of a
new constitution.
A very simple model relevant to our situation is the choice between
the alternatives of (i)a unitary state, (ii) a federal country
with a single Tamil speaking autonomous region, and (iii) a federal
country with separate Tamil and Muslim autonomous regions. Suppose
there are three negotiating parties A,B&C, with clear preferences
as follows :
A. (i),(ii),(iii)
B. (ii),(iii),(i)
C. (iii),(i),(ii)
If all three issues are simultaneously put to the vote, there
will be a deadlock that can be broken by strategic voting, i.e.
a party opting for its second preference with a view to avoiding
its third preference. On the other hand, if the issues are voted
on two at a time, (ii) will be preferred to (iii), (iii) to (i),
and (i) to (ii). Again, this cyclic deadlock can be broken by
strategic voting. The outcome could be determined through strategic
voting, through control of the voting system, through resort to
mediation, etc. What is clear is that "free and fair"
voting will not necessarily produce a satisfactory result. It
is even possible that some "fixing" could produce a
result that everyone prefers to the outcome of the "free
and fair" voting. But, of course, "fixing" could
also produce a disaster. It is for this reason that the rules
adopted for negotiations often require consensus.
A related problem that many have is with the "unreasonableness"
of a "terrorist group", by virtue of its military supremacy,
claiming to represent Tamils and gaining priority seating at the
negotiating table. Is this reasonable? What is the alternative?
As pointed out, in another context, by Blaise Pascal on p90 of
Pensees (1958), New York, EPDutton:
"The most unreasonable things in the world become more reasonable,
because of the unruliness of men. What is less reasonable than
to choose the eldest son of a queen to rule a state? We do not
choose as captain of a ship the passenger who is of the best family.
This law would be absurd and unjust; but because men are so themselves,
and always will be so, it becomes reasonable and just. For whom
will men choose, as the most virtuous and able? We at once come
to blows as each claims to be the most virtuous and able. Let
us then attach this quality to something undisputable. This is
the king's eldest son. That is clear, and there is no dispute.
Reason can do no better, for civil war is the greatest of evils."
Because the negotiating process could decisively influence the
outcome, pre-negotiations (Talks about Talks) are very important.
But which groups participate in the pre-negotiations, and under
what rules? The dilemma may not go away. Inevitably, political
power (established through electoral processes) and military power
(established by military means) gain advantages. Hopefully, much
of the disparities in the negotiating process could be substantially
reduced over extended negotiations, through pressure from other
groups including civil society. But if a level playing field is
a pre-condition, negotiations may never begin. A combination of
domestic political and military circumstances, and external pressures
have belatedly pushed the UNF and the LTTE into negotiations.
Some of the key stakeholders and their concerns were initially
marginalized. We could seek to either spoil the process or to
progressively reform it to accommodate hitherto excluded parties
and their concerns, some of which are listed in your editorial
under reference. It is also important to make the process more
accountable and transparent. Extensive reform is essential, but
it may be possible only incrementally and over a period of time.
Moreover, a perfectly level playing field and complete transparency
may be unattainable even in the long run.
The negotiating process began with only the UNF and the LTTE in
it. The SLMC seems to be moving in, though not yet as an equal
partner. The SLMC was expressly formed a few years ago with a
strong base in the North East because the Muslims of that region
perceived that their concerns were not heeded by Muslim leaders
in the "national" political parties. The PA, JVP, and
the Malaiyaha Tamil parties are among those yet excluded. Some
of those excluded seek to wreck the talks; some others seek to
come in; yet others to introduce their concerns into the agenda.
However flawed the process, it would be criminal to destroy it.
If the ceasefire had not held since December 2001, a few thousand
lives may have been lost in the last 10 months. The cease fire,
as long as it holds, will continue to save thousands of lives
per year, and also bring in, to millions of Sri Lankans, very
considerable benefits. Some of these have been estimated and published
in "Cost of the War" (National Peace Council and Marga,
January 2001). What is required is to push to reform the negotiating
process as much as possible as quickly as possible. I believe
this is what your editorial, and lines, seek to achieve.
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