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May 2006 /August 2006

 

The Turbulent Road To Nepali Democracy

 

-- Cenan Pirani

 

The euphoria felt by many Nepalis following the abdication of the King in March engendered an optimistic outlook for the political future of Nepal. Party leaders on all sides showed their amity with immediate dialogue. Maoist supremo, Prachanda, immediately declared a cease-fire much to the delight of the ruling Seven Party Alliance (SPA). The SPA later returned the favor by conceding to the long time Maoist demand of electing a constituent assembly to draft a constitution.

 

The building of a uniform political trajectory however is not the end all of differences. In July, the SPA declared they would not meet with the Maoists on creating an outline for the elections until the Maoists decommissioned their arms. This ultimately proved to be quite an unrealistic demand. The pressure the SPA and an international community mission applied to the Maoists was deflected with a resolute stubbornness. A quick weighing of the potential consequences, which at worst means the resumption of Maoist military offenses, prompted the international community and SPA to offer the more lenient demand of UN arms monitors that would monitor the government as well as the Maoists. Though technically resolved, the issue is still sensitive for much of the SPA including Prime Minister GP Koirala, whom remains ideologically firm about the Maoists disarming before entering discussions on a constituent assembly. What is more, finding a suitable fate for the monarchy has prompted immediate debate. The SPA’s plan for a national ceremonial role comes in sharp contradiction with Prachanda’s vision of a republic.

 

No matter the issue, it is unlikely that the Maoists will ever bend to the demands of the SPA before the elections. The chaotic political climate, a result of the complete removal of the monarchy from governing authority for the first time ever, is the ideal setting for the Maoists. The SPA can never be in an advantage position against the Maoists in this climate and therefore should give up trying to pressure the Maoists into conceding on contentious issues. Specifically, the SPA and GP Koirala’s incessant urge of Maoist arms decommissioning even after the international community brokered agreement is completely ineffectual. The SPA can also expect the same stifling deadlock on the future of the monarchy, if not more drastic. If the SPA is truly concerned with installing a much needed system of governance in Nepal they should use their position to commence discussions on forming a constituent assembly. The SPA should be reminded of the history of Maoist parties and their ability to be completely obstinate to the wishes of mainstream parties and the monarchy even at times when it proved to be politically detrimental.

 

The Maoists and their political descendents have been in much less favorable situations over the decades. In the 1980s, during the height of the Panchayat regime, the radical Maoist group Nepal Communist Party (NCP) - Mashal broke with the more mainstream NCP - Marxist Leninist (MALE) on supporting a referendum to reform the Panchayat system. Along with discrediting MALE on their decision to support a monarchy made referendum, the Maoist Mashal were highly critical of MALE’s philosophical base. Although all left parties were highly marginalized, the completely intransigent acts of parties like Mashal and the Fourth Convention led to their political ostracism. By the 1990s, a split group from Mashal with a similar name, Masal, led by the original head Mohan Bikram Singh, continued with their unflinching anti-monarchy campaigns. In 1991, they boycotted general elections to instate a parliament under the king that would replace the Panchayat system. For Masal and other left parties, the system still gave too much of an active governing role to the monarchy. The alternative they offered then, elections for a constituent assembly, received highly off-putting criticism from many anti-Panchayat political parties. The boycott ended up pulling down the voting turnout, a great success for Masal. Other parties on the left like Prachanda’s party at the time, the United People’s Front (UPF) (he was also in Mashal sometime before), disrupted election by running for seats only to later forfeit their posts.

 

Prachanda continued the tradition of holding an absolute anti-monarchy position with his organizing of a full-steam armed Maoist resistance movement in the mid-1990s. The especially violent campaigns of the Maoists compelled then Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba to hold peace negotiations with the Maoist leader. After the coup of June 1st, 2001, which left none but the unpopular Gyanendra to replace the late Birendra on the throne, Prachanda began pushing for a constituent assembly and the complete abolition of the monarchy. Demands were met with forthright opposition by the chief negotiator then, Prime Minister GP Koirala. Maoists seeing no fruitful end to negotiations eventually pulled out and continued their violent campaigns. Within two years, King Gyanendra declared an emergency, which upgraded the conflict to a civil war.

 

Currently, the Maoists have few qualms with playing a waiting game with the SPA where necessary. They understand the tenuous level of political control the SPA actually possesses, especially in dealing with the army. Thus, the tacit Maoist threat to resume war, however unlikely, should be ample motivation for the SPA to bend where necessary. This is why the SPA cannot expect the Maoists to bend to their wish of decommissioning arms, even with international community involvement. This is also why it is a bad idea for the SPA to push their aim to give a ceremonial role to the monarchy before constituent assembly elections.

 

If the ultimate goal of the SPA is to build a robust democracy they need to be the group that proactively mollifies barriers to elections for the constituent assembly. The SPA is wrong to think that the Maoists are in a vulnerable and malleable position at this juncture. They are actually at the height of influential engagement compared to years past, where they held the most marginalized positions in the national political arena. However valid the SPA might think their claims are of the Maoists, it cannot expect to win any affective support at this time. What the SPA can work on is speeding the process of constituent assembly elections. This people elected assembly can then decide on these issues with the support of much of the Nepali political community. Differences can be debated in real negotiations that will eventually lead to a political future instead of the current ineffectual back-and-forth.