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Taxonomy of the JVP circa 2005AD -- Kumar David
One is often asked “What is the JVP, is it a left party? Or is it some kind of fascist or racist entity? Where is it going?” If dealing with a fossilised relic from a bygone age it is possible to use some political equivalent of the art of the taxonomist or the paleontologist, but not so easy with a living, mutating entity. Nevertheless the answer to the taxonomic question: ‘How to classify it at this point in time leaving aside future dynamics’, is a way to get started. A party is considered leftist in common parlance depending on its class roots, socio-economic programme, ideological history and the acid test of racial and religious tolerance. All to be judged in the light of its track record in recent years. So how does the JVP shape up? Of one thing there can be no doubt – the JVP is the party of the rural underprivileged. Its rural support base consists of the poorer classes, underprivileged castes and militant or unemployed young people, that is to say the subaltern sections of village society. The layer below the upper crust associated with the UNP and the SLFP, in the Sinhalese village, rallies round the JVP. (To use Ahilan Kadirgamer’s terminology in the Lines editorial of February, the JVP enjoys the support of the “Fourth Person”). The JVP is also a major force in the urban trade union movement where it dominates the state corporate sector in institutions such as the Ceylon Electricity Board, the Petroleum Corporation and railways, and holds a dominant position in university student politics. These are strong arguments for categorisation as a left party, but the case is still not conclusive. The programme and ideology of the JVP add credence to this assessment. Certain programmatic positions are usually associated with the left – support for collective rather than capitalist property, a predilection towards welfareism and populism, suspicion of globalisation and MNCs, and a record of activism in employment and legislative struggles. There is a similar portfolio identified with the left in the ideological domain – the language of socialism or marxism, the bedecking of rallies in red flags, and a hostile relationship with the repressive machinery of state. The JVP “qualifies” on most of these counts, though people like me suffer stomach cramps when the JVP describe itself as marxist. Such niceties notwithstanding, this is not a superficial assessment because, for one thing the leadership itself is serious in its assertions and the cadre is convinced that they are ‘Marxist-Leninists’. Disdainful though others may be about the JVP’s credentials, when its large and radical cadre believes itself to be socialist, it is not possible to be dismissive. The contrast with the LTTE on these programmatic and ideological orientations could not be more striking. It is on the national question that the JVP falls short of the leftist mantle. Readers of these Lines are familiar with the JVP’s stance on the LTTE, the ISGA, peace negotiations and the mechanism to undertake post-tsunami relief in the North and East. To put it bluntly, the JVP is obstructing relief and reconstruction in the North and East, and is undermining the peace and negotiation process. Its revulsion of the LTTE is driving it beyond the brink of anti-Tamil chauvinism. These are a serious transgression akin to the behaviour of right wing or racist parties in, say Europe and India; but to be fair, a question that must give us pause is: ‘To what extent has the JVP been involved in racist street politics?’ The JVP has not involved itself in race riots and pogroms nor in state sponsored repression of minorities; these have been the specialty of the SLFP and UNP in 1958, 1977, 1983, and other occasions. Neither in 1971 nor in 1989-91 were the Tamils specifically targeted, nor is the JVP tainted by anything comparable to the SLFP hoodlums of 1958, Cyril Mathew’s 1983 goon squads and that cradle to the grave racist JR. The reader must pause for a moment, take a step back, and consider which communal forces brought us the ravages of civil war and what share of that responsibility can justly be laid at the door of the JVP. However the record is not all unblemished. Wijeweera’s 1971 five lectures included anti-plantation worker (read up-country Tamil) froth in the guise of economic rationality and combating Indian expansionism. Today the JVP shares the platform of the worst racist scum in the country, for example the April 2005 meeting at Maharagama, and must take full responsibility for whatever putrefaction emanates from this amalgam. Though not a party of pogroms and right-wing racism, the JVP fails the so-called acid test of a socialist or marxist party, uncompromising firmness on the rights of minorities. If one might make a distinction between chauvinist behaviour and street-wise racism, the JVP stands indicted on the former count. It also suffers from atavistic insularity in respect of things foreign. All this brings us to a deep and fundamental question of current political dynamics. By circa 2001/2 history seems to have gone a full circle. Business interests and the elite have made a decision – a decision reflected in Ranil’s bold moves to implement a cease-fire and negotiate a constitutional settlement with the LTTE. The experiences of two decades of war and intense pressure from the North Atlantic countries have contributed to this change. Possibly UNP thinking is: “Give us the south to do with as we please and let Prabharan, or the devil himself, do as he likes in the North and East; just let us get on with liberalised capitalism in the south”. What is central to my argument in this is that there is a significant change in how class actors are now approaching the ethnic issue. In broad-brush terms, the upper classes have decided to do a deal on autonomy, the opposition and reservations are at the plebian levels of rural and urban Sinhalese society. The JVP stance is a reflection of this new alignment; the rise of the Jathika Hela Urumaya (monk’s party), albeit a flash in the pan, further proof. President Kumaratunga’s prevarication about negotiations with the LTTE, the ISGA and mechanism for reconstruction is popularly attributed to JVP pressure. This is not the full picture; it is also a response to fears and hesitations within her own party where these contending forces are represented. It is naive idealism to think that a left party cannot also be afflicted with the diseases of chauvinism – the JVP, I am arguing, is living proof of this schizophrenia. It is a left party on most conventional counts (its programme is pretty messy on these points as well, but that is another matter) but at the same time it is reactionary on the national question. Such is the nature of the beast, a duck-billed platypus. What is important is that its subaltern rural constituency and urban working class base is part of the proper subject matter, the raw material, of the left. Ignore these elements and the non-JVP left will have to import its social base from the moon – another rural constituency and another working class cannot be snatched out of thin air. Therefore, one of the challenges facing the left in southern Sri Lanka is how to relate to and engage the JVP, just as how to relate to the LTTE is a conundrum that it cannot ignore in the North and East. In both instances the leadership is a write-off but in the case of the JVP its active social base and to a degree its political cadre are of consequence. In the closing paragraphs of this article I will consider the directions in which the JVP may move in the coming period. The acrimonious policy confrontation between the President and the JVP is unbearable; something must give or the government burst asunder. But if the government falls the JVP, the SLFP and the President will all, in short order, be swept out. There may be a muddled period of horse-trading but Ranil and the UNP are biding their time in the wings. If expelled from government, or defeated at the hustings, the JVP cannot survive politically by limiting itself to non-violence in the face of government-LTTE negotiations and neo-liberal economics. It has not morphed into an entity that can retain its cadre in a purely parliamentary space. My ominous premonition is that if the JVP plays with fire again the ruling classes and the state, with imperialism’s support, will not hesitate to wipe it out in another bloodbath. The JVP is apprehensive, and this is one reason not to quit government whatever imprecations the President showers on its head. In closing I will comment on an allied theme. From the inception the JVP’s motive for entering the UPFA government was to pursue a mixed constitutional and extra-constitutional strategy for power - hence the rumoured infiltration of the lower ranks of the armed forces. Public domain evidence of chauvinist elements penetrating the forces is mostly anecdotal but not unreliable. The JVP is no longer the feckless ultra-left simpleton of 1971, nor any longer seeks the reckless folly of a full frontal assault on the state as in 1989-90. The leopard has exchanged its spots for sophisticated rosettes and today’s more complex strategy envisages extra-constitutional offensives within a parliamentary game plan. The leadership’s visit, cap in hand, to the U.S. Embassy in Colombo in January and Amarawansa’s sycophantic letter in April to US Under-Secretary for State, Christine Rocca, have to be seen in this context. Certainly the presence of US troops in post-tsunami Sri Lanka constrained the LTTE and the JVP was pleased; and yes, the JVP would like to keep US policy as hostile to the LTTE as possible. But these are inadequate grounds for friendly engagement with what, in the eyes of its own cadre, is the strategic global enemy and the fountain head of neo-liberal economics. Trapped, as it is between a rock and a hard place and well aware of the perils of US hostility if the political atmosphere turns violent and dangerous, the JVP is playing for expanded space. The US routinely plays along with sinister schemes and dark forces all over the world and it may not be averse to another iron in its Sri Lankan fire, hence the JVP’s gamble is not entirely fantasy. Time will tell how this rendezvous, if the invitation is accepted by Washington, will transform the JVP.
Hong Kong 8th May 2005 |