Post Tsunami Reconstruction and the Eastern Muslim Question

Discussion Paper based on a CPA-Field Mission to Ampara and Batticaloa March 16^th -18^th

Presented at the Seminar on ‘The Eastern Muslim Question’ held on March 31^st 2005 at Hotel Renuka.

Mirak Raheem, Research Associate, Peace and Conflict Analysis Unit, Centre for Policy Alternatives

Fara Haniffa, Senior Research Fellow, Social Scientists’ Association [1]

While negotiating a settlement that meets both their interests, the Government of Sri Lanka (GoSL) and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) have had to confront the needs of the Muslim people. The Muslim Community’s place as a primary stakeholder in the peace process is widely acknowledged, as is its role for the success of any durable solution to the ethnic conflict. [2]   Yet, the means of their inclusion into the peace process, and the particular role they will play are by no means agreed.  The ‘Eastern Muslim Question’ that we plan to address today refers primarily to the socio-political situation of the Muslims of the Eastern Province in the aftermath of the Tsunami of December 26^th 2004, the recent killings involving Muslims and the response to this situation both by the community and other key actors. While acknowledging the critical importance of recognizing and addressing the needs and aspirations of the Muslims of the NorthEast as a whole, this paper will focus particularly on the issues of Muslims from the districts of Batticaloa and Ampara. While we recognize the importance and distinctiveness of the needs and aspirations of the Muslims of Trincomalee, as well as those expelled from Jaffna, Mannar and Vanni the overlap of the issues facing the Muslim communities across the NorthEast, this paper is based primarily on research specific to the above two districts, namely Batticaloa and Ampara.

This paper will examine three key issues that form part of ‘the Eastern Muslim Question’:

1)                 The impact of the tsunami – the Eastern Muslim perspective of post-tsunami relief and reconstruction as at 18^th March 2005

2)                 The security situation in the East – the impact of the recent spate of killings as a result of the struggle between the LTTE and the Karuna faction on the Muslim community.  

3)                 The peace process – examining the attempts by the Muslim community to become a party to the track 1 peace talks and attempts to resolve issues on the ground.

This report is based both on interviews in Colombo and a three day field trip to Ampara and Batticaloa Districts, and the border area of Welikanda, Polonnaruwa District from the 16^th- 18^th of March 2005. Meetings were conducted with Muslim community leaders in Ampara town, Batticaloa town and Maruthamunai, government officials in the GA’s office Ampara and the LTTE. The research team conducted interviews in Colombo with key stakeholders including leaders of Muslim political parties and civil society. The research team consisted of Dr Devanesan Nessiah, Dr Darini Rajasingham Senanayake, Fara Haniffa, Mirak Raheem and Ruwani Wickramsinghe. 

Background : Muslim identity and ethnicity in the conflict

The question of Muslim ethnicity and identity is one that haunts the peace process. It is not something that has been of issue for Sinhala dominated governments, be they UNP- or SLFP-led coalitions, but is constantly raised in various forms by the LTTE and other Tamil political actors. This issue of ethnicity is important in placing Muslims within the narrative of Tamil nationalism. Historically, there has been recognition by Tamil leaders- beginning with Ponnambalam Ramanathan who opened the can of worms in the first place [3] - that the Muslims have a right to their own origin story and to emphasize an identity based on religion rather than language. However, the LTTE has had a history of insisting on the ‘Tamilness’ of Muslims and of calling Muslims Islamiya Thamizar—as Tamils practicing Islam, falling within the totality of the Tamil nation. Muslims’ repeated refusal to be thus categorized, and the difficulty that such refusal poses for the narrative of Tamil nationalism and its category of Tamil speaking people has meant that the LTTE castigates Muslims as traitors. [4]

As Muslims are quick to point out, and as Dr. S. Hasbullah has argued recently, Tamil nationalism had never worked out a position for the Muslims whom it claimed as part of the polity that it represented. [5] At no point were the specific interests of the Muslims, their lack of access to adequate land or their educational backwardness, for instance, highlighted as an issue pertinent for Tamil nationalist agitation. And as Taraki’s column recently stated even now the LTTE does not have a clear position regarding the Muslims. [6] Regardless of the fact that many Muslims, especially from the Eastern province saw common cause with Tamilness, to the extent that they were participants of the Tamil Nationalist struggle, the LTTE never had a clearly thought out policy with regards to the Muslims. The latter is true of all the armed groups, although some had more Muslim representation in their rank and file than others. 

The particular category, by which Muslims can be identified therefore, is still disputed by the LTTE. Some of the high level Muslim representatives that we talked to also mentioned the fact that this currently takes the form of LTTE reluctance to concede the Muslims a political identity even as they grudgingly accept their right to a cultural identity. Despite the differing views regarding identity, it must be emphasized that the LTTE representatives in the Eastern Province whom we met seemed to be, publicly at least, accommodating of Muslims’ socio-economic space in the North-East. The current LTTE Eastern leadership that we met stressed that they were working at building bridges with the Muslim community, recognizing the importance of winning over their support. However, the place of Muslims within the narrative of Tamil nationalism is a cause for concern, particularly regarding the place of Muslims in any Tamil administered Tamil homeland.

The background to the ethnic violence in the East is fairly well known today. Patterns of coexistence in the Eastern Province were often peppered by incidents of localized Tamil-Muslim violence. These were mainly specific to certain villages and would end within the course of the day in the face of the need for coexistence for daily business. However in the mid to late 1980s the polarization became more marked with the involvement of armed elements: the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF), the Sri Lankan Armed Forces, and Tamil militants. The Tamil Muslim Riots of 1985, the siege of Kattankudi in 1987, the IPKF bombing of Ottamavadi, the Mosque massacres of Katankudi and Eravur, the disappearance of the Haj pilgrims from Kurukkal Madam are all pivotal moments for Muslims in recounting their victimization due to the conflict. Additionally inhabitants of 33 Muslim villages in the Batticaloa district were displaced during the conflict. Most of these people moved to the densely populated town of Kattankudi further swelling the population of that town. The loss of land and property owned by Muslims which was taken over by the LTTE or Tamil farmers further compounded Muslim grievances. The 1990 expulsion of Muslim in the North by the LTTE and the resulting 15 year displacement of the Northern Muslims have often been attributed, in discussions, to the disturbances in the East. Certain small scale reprisal killings of Tamils by Muslims in the aftermath of militant attacks have also been recorded. These were largely by Muslim Home Guards with overt and cover support from the Special Task Force (STF). Further, Muslims in the East are accused of questionable land acquisitions and are perceived as taking advantage of Tamil misfortune. Muslim purchasing of paddy land from Tamil absentee landlords, buying up Tamil owned shops, the creeping spread of Muslim villages into Tamil villages is part of the contemporary reality of the Eastern Province. Any illegality in this process is not yet established, however Tamil and specifically LTTE resentment of this process has been recorded.  

Impact of the Tsunami

The tsunami of December 26^th 2004 had an immense impact on the Muslim communities of the Eastern Province. In terms of sheer loss of life and damage to private property the Eastern Muslims have been, both in terms of the proportion to the overall Muslim population and in actual figures, “the most affected community.”  It is estimated that approximately half of the close to 30,000 people killed in the tsunami are Muslim. Kalmunai and Sainthamarudhu stand out as some of the most severely affected areas in the country, but are just a few of the numerous Muslim communities along the Eastern shoreline that were affected.

While the tsunami-recovery process has shifted from emergency relief to rehabilitation and reconstruction, the Muslims of the Eastern Province have become increasingly disgruntled as to how they have been treated. Their critique of the recovery process is two-fold:  they find the pace of rehabilitation and reconstruction to be too slow, and feel discriminated against in relation to the South. Their protest over the pace of the government’s post-tsunami response bears resemblance to similar criticisms made across the island in tsunami-affected areas. As numerous newspaper articles attest the complaints of long delays are common to all affected parts of the country.  The sluggish pace at which the issue of housing, be it moving displaced people from welfare camps or the allocation of alternative land for permanent housing in light of the coastal buffer zone, has been addressed is a source of frustration and distress for the tsunami victims and those involved in tsunami assistance. Constructing temporary shelters for the displaced is considered a priority for the Ampara district. There is confusion about land purchase and acquisition by the government for both temporary and permanent shelter, questions were raised about the structure of the permanent shelter- whether it should have one or two rooms. There was also considerable skepticism about the government plan to construct apartments.   Tsunami victims also complain of being ignored by the government and of not having received adequate relief in the form of basic items such as food, tools and implements for re-starting livelihoods.

This criticism is heavily coloured by a feeling of discrimination on the part of the Eastern Muslims. This perception of discrimination is founded on the belief that the pace of recovery is particularly slow in the East, given that the state structure’s focus is on the South. Frustration was also voiced at the delays caused by officials of key agencies like TAFREN and the UDA making little more than token appearances in the region. This feeling is further compounded in that Eastern Muslims believe that as “the most affected community” they have not received assistance proportionate to their losses. The CPA field mission did not, because of the mission’s purpose and time constraints, seek to take up the task of examining the comparative relief and reconstruction efforts and issues of delivery.  We cannot, therefore comment on the legitimacy of this claim. What can be said is that there was clear feeling among the tsunami victims, voiced by interviewed community leaders, politicians and members of civil society, of feeling ignored and anger at the pace of reconstruction on the ground. A striking development that we were told about was the response of the Marathamunai community. Faced with the destruction and displacement suffered by its community and the lack of government action and interest, the people took to the streets both to highlight their problems and bring the GA to the village. (The official had not visited the village since the tsunami) The GA was then presented a set of proposal drawn up by the community. The proposals, as explained to us, included designs for two storey apartment style buildings demonstrating the community’s determination to find creative solutions to the pressing post-tsunami problems, and involved a participatory approach.     

The destruction along the Eastern coastline of Amapara district was clearly phenomenal and much of the rubble of destroyed dwellings remained at the sites three months after the event. As far as we could see there was much less clearing here than in the South or even in the LTTE controlled Mullaitivu coastal region. [7] We observed persons clearing debris and stacking bricks from what seemed to be their own houses. Several practical difficulties regarding the distance from Colombo as well as the local organization of the town were cited as reasons for this state of affairs.  For instance the difficulties of bringing heavy machinery to Ampara through not very good roads, and the near-impossibility of moving these machines and vehicles from the main road to the beach through the narrow streets common to these coastal towns were mentioned.  The assertion was also made that people were loathe to let their houses be completely demolished, or let others do the clearing as they would then lose the markers of their properties. Many structures remained only partially damaged and we observed people constructing makeshift dwellings in the shells of their former homes. Despite being aware of the government notification regarding the 200 meter buffer zone the displaced people seem to have returned in significant numbers to their partially damaged homes well inside the 200 meter zone. Officials indicated however that there would be flexibility regarding the enforcement of this zone. There would be no demolition or eviction of people who were currently residing there. People were free to move in at their own risk.

In keeping with the general trend through out the island here too the majority of the casualties were women and children. There were many theories produced as to why so many women were trapped. Some of the stories indicated that the women were trapped while trying to save children, that they were trapped by their clothing or by their reluctance to emerge without clothes. Others stated that the high parapet walls around each property coupled with the fact that the access roads were extraordinarily narrow were more significant as a cause for why so many women were trapped. It was also clear that as elsewhere women suffered greatly from the insecurity of camp life and that the need for temporary shelters, at a minimum, was great. 

Permanent housing and land shortage particularly in light of the proposed buffer zone, was an issue that was brought to our attention. Due to the scarcity of land the settlements on the Kalmunai coastal belt had ventured very close to the waterline and we observed many large elaborately built homes- especially in Kalmunai and Sainthamarathu- on the beach itself. The land crunch produced by the imposition of the 200 meter buffer zones was described to us repeatedly in terms of a common Eastern Province custom- that of the dowry.  We were told that it was the custom amongst Eastern Province Muslims that each daughter was invariably provided with her own house at the time of marriage. The loss of the 200 meters was therefore significant in that many of those households will not be able to provide their daughters with a dowry. They stated also that the flats that were proposed for the area as an alternative to land would not be acceptable for the same reason.  It was also pointed out that one of the particular problems included providing houses for couples from affected families that married after the Tsunami. Given the insecurity of the conditions that they lived in many families were opting to finalise marriages for children that were of age.  Further, the communal living suggested by the common access ways etc. of the flats was considered unsuitable. Some of the plans that we saw for the two story flats had provision for private entrances. Clearly the socio cultural repercussions of the disaster will be many.

People’s resentment at the endless delays was directed at two key actors: central government and Muslims politicians of all political hues. The failure of central government to manage and execute an appropriate response to the tsunami disaster was cited by some of the interviewees. In Maruthamunai, the community perceived the GA not visiting their area for several weeks since the Tsunami as symptomatic of central government apathy and disregard of the tsunami victims and their plight. With regards to discrimination, leading politicians cited examples such as the level of assistance provided to Panama, a predominantly Sinhala area, relative to the damage it suffered, as the influence of a district level bureaucracy heavily weighted in favour of the Sinhalese.  The Sinhala-centric nature of the central government was cited as a crucial factor in the historically discriminatory allocation of land that is said to continue to this day. Hence, the allocation of land for resettlement of the Tsunami affected is constrained, we were told, both by bureaucratic red tape and discriminatory land allocation policies. 

The Land Question and Ethnic Boundaries

Land is an old issue in the Eastern Province.  It is the heartland of post colonial state colonisation schemes which drastically altered demographic patterns in the province and the site of the country’s first post colonial communal riot (directly linked to colonization schemes). To this date land remains highly ethnicized in this part of the country. Muslim owned land in LTTE controlled “uncleared areas” that Muslims have only limited access to are a deeply felt issue amongst the Muslims. Such a situation has been exacerbated by administrative mistakes that have morphed into ethnic issues. For instance, we were told of one case where two sets of permits for chenna cultivation had been given for the same parcel of land, Administratively speaking Muslim DS divisions constitute a miniscule percentage of land occupation and Muslims in both Amapara and Batticaloa expressed great dissatisfaction with the unavailability of land for their use. The case of the Ampara district where the state and Sinhala settlements are allotted 76% of the district while Muslims and Tamils have 15% and 9% respectively is a case in point. In Batticaloa District it was pointed out that Muslims, ¼ of the population, enjoyed 40 square kilometers of an area of over 1400 square kilometers. The central problem of land shortage faced by the tsunami affected communities North of Attalachchenai is intimately linked to the issue of ethnic delimitation of DS divisions and the unwritten law that insists that the ethnic balance within these divisions is not altered. Amapara District in particular, and the Eastern Province in general, seems ripe for the revisiting of the issue of ethnicised land allocation. A story related by many during our visit to Ampara was how a community of several Muslim and Tamil families in the Pottuvil DS division were willing to settle together in a spot of land about a kilometer inland from where they used to live but were not allowed to do so due to ethnicised land allocation. Apparently before plans were completed for resettlement it was revealed that the land selected belonged in fact to the Sinhala DS division of Lahugala and was, therefore unavailable for the settlement of Tamils and Muslims. This example was repeatedly cited by government and NGO officials as typical of the ethnicised nature of land in the district.  

The failure of Muslims politicians of the East to provide an effective response to the tsuanmi disaster was criticized by community leaders, civil society representatives and by the politicians themselves. Ampara for instance has 12 Muslim Members of Parliament and has representation at the cabinet level, yet they have been unable to make a significant difference, we were told. The explanations for this ranged from the general lack of influence of MPs to inadequate use of leverage by MPs currently in the coalition government serving as cabinet ministers. In addition to the inability of Muslim MPs to provide for their constituencies, the divisiveness of the Muslim political leadership and its attempts at gaining short term political mileage were cited as key obstacles to the development of clear direction in dealing with the tsunami disaster. We were told both by a leading politician and a local aid worker in Ampara of an example of this with regards to the resettlement of communities from coastal areas. Families who have agreed to move inland and have given their consent to their grama niladari find themselves not just under pressure from their respective communities but also from politicians who do not want their vote banks been broken up and who also see political gains to be made from merely opposing any political initiative that might be proposed by a rival politician.   Complaints were also made about politicians’ investing resources in costly, high budget, high visibility projects to the detriment of other quicker, more community-friendly and practicable solutions.

The lack of rapid and adequate resettlement coupled with an increasing perception of being ignored is creating a groundswell of resentment. The Mardhamunai community took to the streets in early March protesting the slow pace of recovery and the GA not visiting the area since the tsunami. While this protest went off peacefully and achieved its target of getting central government to agree to act on its behalf, other protests may prove more unruly, leading to violence and increased anger at government inefficiency and apathy that could snowball across the East Coast.

The lack of Muslim representation in the on-going negotiations between GoSL and LTTE for a Joint-Mechanism for tsunami recovery has created further suspicion among Eastern Muslims. The joint mechanism will be responsible for the supervision and allocation of resources for the post-tsunami recovery process, with the LTTE expected to gain a majority say in the decision-making process of that mechanism. According to recent newspaper reports, the mechanism will consist of an apex body and district bodies reflecting the ethnic ratio of populations in each district. The politicians interviewed all complained of a lack of consultation with the representatives of the Muslim Community. Thus, the Muslims find themselves in a difficult position as they realize that despite the extent to which they have been affected they are being sidelined in the planning stages of a mechanism that will have a decisive impact on the recovery process. Their main fear is that they will be presented with a fait accompli that will provide the LTTE with the key powers leaving little room for Muslim input into decision making with regards to Muslim areas.   In addition, the Muslim experience of NorthEast institutions, be they the NorthEast Provincial Council or the Subcommittee on Immediate Humanitarian and Rehabilitation Needs (SIHRN), has been one of limited representation and a lack of effective decision-making powers. Disquiet at the LTTE being made responsible for the entire NorthEast came up in many of the conversations, and is a fundamental issue that must be addressed by the government, the LTTE, Norwegian facilitators and civil society. The joint mechanism, whether it is linked to the peace process or not, will be a basis upon which an interim administration will be founded. The exclusion of Muslims therefore, poses risks to the recovery and peace processes, and to the future of Muslim representation in the North East administration.

Security Situation

Despite the death and destruction the tsunami created, it offered renewed hope in the cooperation and goodwill between the various communities, thereby reinforcing faith in the ability of the communities to live in relative harmony and to find a sustainable peace. The steady deterioration of the security situation over the last two months has, however put tremendous strain on Tamil-Muslim relations with a risk of aggravating already existing tensions and of escalating the individual acts of violence into communal responses.

The deterioration of the security situation over the last few weeks has been largely due to the opening up of a ‘new front’ between the LTTE and the Karuna faction. While the LTTE Vanni faction succeeded in crushing Karuna’s attempt at securing control of LTTE held areas in the East in April 2004 Karuna’s faction or the Tamil National Army as it calls itself has apparently re-established itself as a combat group. Muslims have found themselves caught in the middle of this conflict, becoming the victims of killings, abductions and threats in this internecine struggle. While the recent spate of LTTE-Karuna faction killings, that increased after the assassination of Kaushalyan, (LTTE Political Head of Batticaloa and Ampara), have taken place from Welikanda all the way down to Tirukovil the killings and abductions of Muslims have occurred primarily on the border areas of Batticaloa and Welikanda, Polonnaruwa District. Some of the key incidents include: 

March 5 - 4 Muslims were killed along with 1 Tamil and 1 Sinhalese in Kolakanawadiya, between Welikanda and Manampitiya on the Batticaloa-Polonnaruwa highway.

March 8 - 4 Muslims from Oddamavaadi go missing, leads to protest. They re-appear following SLMM reports that they were found in the jungle hiding from elephants

March 9 – A Muslims three-wheel driver, Abdul Raheem Hammed on hire from Oddamawadi, was abducted near Kajuwatte and killed.

The identity of the killers and abductors is by no means confirmed but the link to the LTTE- Karuna faction struggle is more or less established. The killings have created a climate of fear, intrigue and suspicion, with knock-on effects not just for Muslim-LTTE relations but for Muslim-Tamil relations in general. Muslims have got caught up in the internecine conflict as the two sides have accused Muslim civilians of collaborating with the other. In Muslim villages surrounding the Karuna Camp in Thivichchenai, Welikanda the level of fear has increased exponentially due to the presence of armed paramilitary personnel. One resident told the field mission that this level of fear was far greater than at any period during the conflict. People are afraid to move at night and relations with their neighbouring Tamil village which were maintained throughout the conflict have deteriorated. Then, an unsigned leaflet was distributed in Kattankudy on March 16^th reminding the Muslims of what they had suffered under the LTTE and asking them why the LTTE was so interested in re-building relationships with the Muslim community at this specific time. The Muslim community acknowledges that there are ‘other parties’ at work trying to create tensions between the LTTE and Muslims. In this atmosphere of fear and suspicion rumours are rife, adding to the tension as armed actors play out their struggle against each other and as opportunists attempt to destabilize the delicate balance between the communities in the East. The Muslims have responded with demands for intervention by the state, international community and the two fighting sides and organized protests such as the two day protest in Valaichennai after the murder of Abdul Rahim.  

The ideal solution to this security crisis for the Muslim community would, obviously, be to bring an end to the cycle of violence between the LTTE and Karuna Faction. The Muslims are not in any position to make the parties accede to this demand. The GoSL, at least at this moment in time, sees little advantage in disbanding and disarming the Karuna faction that operates out of government controlled areas and border areas, or in taking action against members of the Sri Lankan Forces directly assisting this faction. The LTTE in turn, are not willing to recognize the Karuna faction as an independent force, therefore brining them into the Ceasefire Agreement or giving them the political space to function as a political party is a near impossibility. Hence, the deterioration of the ground situation is set to continue.

In addition to the direct impact on the Muslim community, the violence has had severe repercussions for Muslim-LTTE relations. Following the assassination of Kaushalyan, Thamilchelvan and key LTTE leaders met Muslim leaders from Batticaloa to consolidate the LTTE’s bonds with the Muslim community. However, despite the promises to ensure security for the community the LTTE has failed to stem the tide of violence. The perception that the LTTE has been responsible for some, if not all the killings of Muslim civilians, has only furthered the distrust of the Muslim community towards the LTTE. Thus, the Muslims who talked to the field mission – including members of the North East Peace Assembly (NEMPA) that had previously had some success working with the LTTE - voiced their fears that nothing of substance will emerge out of the engagement process with the LTTE, and that it will only serve as a propaganda ploy for the group. The security situation is a pressing issue that requires immediate attention as it poses a threat to the entire Eastern Province given the escalation in violence and it may only be a matter of time before a factional struggle becomes a communal one. 

The Peace Process

The inclusion of Muslims within the Peace Process has been an ongoing struggle, particularly since the Indo-Lanka accord of 1987.  During the honeymoon period that followed the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding on February 22^nd 2002 there was some softening of the LTTE stance on the Muslims. For instance Anton Balasingham’s comment at Pirabhakaran’s Press Conference on the 1990 expulsion (“strategic blunder”), the 2002 Pirabhakaran-Hakeem meeting in the Vanni, the subsequent Hakeem-Balansingham meeting at the Royal Norwegian Embassy in London, were considered successful preludes to Muslim inclusion. The ultimately negotiated prize was the right of participation granted to Rauf Hakeem within the government delegation as the leader of the SLMC and a leader of the Muslim Community, not as a member of the cabinet. Hakeem was to then lead the Muslim delegation to the second round of peace talks. This insistence by the LTTE on highlighting Hakeem’s position as SLMC leader was taken as a sign of the LTTE’s acceptance of Muslims’ aspirations. Another story recounted to us was that four places were designated at the conference table for the government, the LTTE, the Norwegians and the Muslims when the latter were to arrive as a separate delegation. Muslims expected to participate at the second round of talks. However the second round never materialized. The several meetings that were subsequently held were termed the second session of the first round and so on. The reason for delaying the Muslim inclusion became an issue of postponement until “an appropriate time.” 

The Subcommittees on Immediate Humanitarian Issues (SIHRN) and the Subcommittee on Gender Issues did not include Muslims as a third party but as part of the government representation. The point made then and often afterwards was that the talks are initial stages and as such can only be between the aggressors, regardless of the fact that such decisions would have serious effects on the Muslim population residing in those districts. The inclusion of the SLMC leader as part of the negotiations team was an important achievement for the Muslims. Although a separate Muslim delegation was not recognized, his inclusion as leader of the largest Muslim party was seen as a positive sign. However, in retrospect, its symbolic import – the leader of the Muslim Congress participating as a member of the government delegation- could also be read as Muslims being regarded as a part of the Sri Lankan state. Seeing Muslims as a part of the state is consistent with the position taken by the LTTE to refuse separate Muslim participation in the current peace process.  Further, the inclusion of the terms “at an appropriate time” on each of the pronouncements on the process is something that requires further clarification. [8]   The LTTE holds to its stance of refusing Muslim representation until the discussion of “relevant and substantive political issues.” The LTTE must be persuaded to recognize that normalization talks too need Muslim representation given that issues of Muslim return to the North and Muslim-Tamil relations in the East are crucial questions that must be addressed in any such forum. Recent LTTE calls for the inclusion of Muslims within a joint mechanism is a promising sign but it is yet to be seen if anything will materialize from it. The LTTE argument that only those that carried arms can be privy to the initial talks, Tamil politicians’ raising the question of whether Muslims have earned the right to participate on an equal footing, etc. is interpreted by both the Muslim parliamentarians and some young Muslim student groups as a statement that their failure has been to not engage in armed struggle.  

Both the UNP and the UPFA have indicated their agreement, in principle, to the participation of Muslims in the peace process. However, neither has clearly committed to the inclusion of a separate Muslim delegation at the outset.  Previous experience indicates that neither is especially committed to the issue and the extent of their commitment might in fact be directly related to the clout that Muslim MPs have in bringing coalition governments into power. [9] It seems likely that the ruling parties in government of either hue will have no compunctions about under emphasizing Muslim interests in order to bring the LTTE to the table. The Norwegians too are focused on the GoSL and LTTE – the Muslim demands at best are one of the tougher issues that need to be negotiated between the two parties to the conflict, at worst an impediment to a peaceful negotiated settlement of the conflict. In relation to the joint mechanism to address the Tsunami affected areas, the LTTE and the Government seem to be making decisions with no consultation of Muslims. While Muslim representation within the mechanism has been suggested, Muslims so far have not been publicly consulted at any level of the planning process. It is unclear if the Muslim MPs in the government have been privy to such discussions either.

Clearly, the joint mechanism will serve as a model for the interim authority for the NorthEast and will accordingly have far reaching consequences for the Muslims. It is imperative therefore that there is consultation of both Muslim parliamentarians and local Muslim civil society organizations that have been doing work with those affected by the tsunami. 

Political Representation of the Eastern Muslim Community

The history of Muslim representation has mainly been one of affiliation with larger parties. While the UNP and later the SLFP, to a lesser extent, was chosen by Muslim politicians in the greater part of the South, Muslim MPs contesting from the Eastern Province often contested under the Federal Party. The emergence of the SLMC as an independent Muslim party can be linked to the ethnic conflict, as well as the introduction of the proportional representation system that gave smaller parties a greater chance at winning seats from various districts. It is important to note that the SLMC emerged as the key opposition in the NorthEast Provincial Council following the elections of November 1988. The recent emergence of several Muslim splinter groups of the main SLMC has meant that a section of the Muslim leadership has been overly preoccupied with maintaining internal cohesion. The number of Muslim parties/factions seems to be increasing. Consequently, Eastern Muslim civil society expressed concern regarding their political representatives and their inability to deliver in relation to either the Tsunami or the peace process. The LTTE and the government have used the very public divisiveness amongst Muslim politicians to undermine Muslims’ right to representation at the peace talks. This point that Muslim political divisiveness was used as delaying tactic and an excuse for non-inclusion of the Muslims was frequently cited to us on our mission. The question of what manner of representation will be possible and at what point has been left open on the assumption that the Muslim position on the issue is itself fragmented.  

The larger Muslim parties are aligned in a way that there is a clear UNP or UPFA affiliation on the part of the SLMC and the National Unity Alliance (NUA) respectively. It is possible that the two parties will decide the manner in which Muslims find representation at any future peace talks.  The long overdue Muslim Peace Secretariat (MPS) has emerged as a result of NUA-SLMC Memorandum of Understanding. It plans, we were told to provide a forum for the airing of all Muslim political perspectives and to provide support to any future Muslim delegation to the peace talks. Currently the MPS is generally perceived as being mandated only by the two major parties. Eastern Province civil society organizations view it as little more than a party mechanism of the two currently largest parties with little or no real possibility of representing a synthesized Muslim position including a wider political and civil society perspective. However the plan to institutionalize a mechanism whereby all Muslim perspectives could theoretically be considered is a promising step. It is currently focused we were told on bringing together the Muslim members of parliament. It should now be expanded to include greater civil society participation and input. It should ideally be the forum for any consultative process through which Muslim proposals in response to the government and the LTTE can be produced. [10]

Muslim Demands: Political Options for Eastern Muslims

The recognition that Muslims have specific demands that must be addressed in any discussion on the resolution of the ethnic question has been acknowledged. Muslim demands at this point – outside of a generalized call for a substantial degree of autonomy are yet to crystallize into a public proposal.  Various individuals and organizations have put forward proposals that emphasize different priorities in granting autonomy to Muslims within the North and East administration. The suggestions are many and varied and there seems to be a degree of flexibility in the kind of mechanisms that might be agreed on.  But the time is ripe for some public debate on the specifics.  The general truism of the peace process is the amazing similarities in position amongst the various actors. The Eastern Muslim representatives, both political and civil society, too seem to have similar position and in addition seem willing to be flexible with regards to the manner in which their aspirations can be reflected in any mechanism.  It is therefore essential that Muslims have a variety of worked out options through which their aspirations can be accommodated in any future administrative structure.

Some of the options that were discussed during our visit and drawn to our attention as possible administrative mechanisms include:

1.      A Muslim autonomous region/ homeland/ enclave in the South East (Samanthurai, Pothuvil, Kalmunai) , including non-contiguous areas for some Eastern Muslim majority communities;

2.      A Muslim enclave region in the South East (Samanthurai, Pothuvil, Kalmunai) , excluding non-contiguous areas, and with agreements with the GoSL and LTTE for protection of local Sinhala and Tamil minorities in the Muslim region that would emerge from the peace process/ settlement;

3.      Guarantees from the LTTE and GoSL for power sharing with the Muslims at all levels of an ISGA or other interim administration that would lead to a final settlement in the North East without an autonomous Muslim region.

Both the SLMC and the NUA indicated that they were in the process of formulating their own set of proposals. The SLMC, after observation visits and consultation with international experts claim to have a formulated set of proposals that they are currently in the process of finalizing through consultations amongst key stakeholders. Several other Muslim civil society organizations – the Northern Muslim Rights Organization, the North East Muslim Assembly, and the Mosque Federation of the Eastern Province etc. seem to have their own sets of proposals prepared. It is timely now to have some public consultations whereby the various proposals, particularly those more detailed, are analyzed and debated openly with the participation of local experts and civil society representatives from all communities to ensure a fairer representation of differing interests and needs.

LTTE Muslim relationships on the ground.

Repeated assurances that the Muslims have nothing to fear from the LTTE are no longer adequate. The LTTE needs work out a more through policy with regards to the Muslims within the Tamil speaking homeland. The indication still is that the LTTE does not consider the Muslims as legitimate counterparts—at most only as minor players, and at worst a nuisance. The fact that Prabakaran accepted the expulsion as a mistake, and that Muslims have been allowed to go into their lands in LTTE controlled areas and engage in their livelihood activities is touted as a basis on which to forgive and forget. This clearly is not adequate. Muslims are being asked by the LTTE to trust them, assuring them that the LTTE will not do to the Muslims what the state did to the Tamils. However, past experiences of LTTE intransigence and brutality loom too large and cannot alleviate Muslims’ uncertainty and mistrust.

Attempts at resolving ground level problems have been made through the North East Muslim Peace Assembly setting up local committees consisting of the district LTTE leadership and district Mosque Federations. In response to the outbreak of tension and violence forums were established for the local LTTE and Muslim leadership to meet, to re-build confidence and trust, and to prevent new incidents escalating into violence. Such a crisis response committee was set up to respond to the violence in Muttur in April 2003. Such forums were also established to deal with long-term issues such as land where Muslims were demanding the return of land owned by them and seized by the LTTE during the conflict, most of which is currently being cultivated by Tamil farmers. These committees offered a mechanism for reinforcing trust and confidence at the local level, consolidating developments at Track 1 peace talks and resolving local problems locally. These committees offered some mode of communication and confidence building particularly during the bouts of ethnic clashes between 2002 and 2003 where the Muslim and Tamil communities found themselves trapped in cycles of hartals, riots, abductions and attacks. We were told that their success in the land issue was limited. Such mechanisms are a dire necessity for the new theatre of operations that has opened up due to the LTTE-Karuna faction clashes.

The fact that the LTTE currently makes an attempt to maintain good relations with Muslim civil society in the area is a good sign. As the peace process needs to be taken forward amongst Tamils and Muslims at all levels.  The LTTE representatives in the East stressed the need for trust and confidence building with the Muslim community and made reference to the attempts to dialogue with Muslim community leaders. However, the fact that the LTTE considers such interaction to be evidence of its good will and that some Muslim civil society organizations consider such interaction to be pleasant but with little tangible results and more than that, as helping LTTE propaganda, is a little unfortunate. Such mechanisms are considered suspect by local politicians who perceive them to be mechanisms whereby the LTTE tries to bypass engagement with the political leaders.  Greater assurances are therefore needed from the LTTE and a more firm commitment to respect Muslims return and provide security guarantees in both the North and the East.

 Reflections

Certain civil society organizations in the East articulated a position that was becoming clear for some time now; they claimed that the Muslims of the North, the East and the South were three distinct groupings with distinct problems and interests. [11] Sri Lanka’s Muslim population is dispersed through out the country, and the recent, geographically specific conflict, affected Muslims differently in the different regions. Their problems, therefore, are often regionally specific and require specific redress. For instance, the interests of the concentrated Muslim populations living in the Eastern Province are different from those displaced from the North contemplating return and those living in Sinhala majority areas in the South. Recognizing this specificity of interests is a perspective from which the most useful kinds of conversations as to what Muslims’ options are could be undertaken for the future. Muslim civil society in the Eastern Province is fairly sophisticated today and represents a strong presence that counters the unfortunate fissures amongst their political representatives.  Their realization of the specificity of their grievances is a step forward. However it is essential that such a step is matched by an understanding of the interests of the larger Muslim community, their mixed settlement patterns and the consequences to all Muslims from a settlement that involves the east. For instance there must be a discussion of what options will be open to Northern Muslims if political options favoring the East are privileged. And for the East too it must be kept in mind that the everyday reality for Muslims living in Muslim majority areas and those living in the more isolated villages in Tamil majority areas is significantly different.

One civil society actor that we spoke with pointed out that there was great anxiety amongst Southern Muslim politicians that the Eastern Muslim parties were usurping their role as the leaders of the greater Muslim community.  There is also uneasiness as to what repercussions Eastern Muslim ethnic politics will have on the Southern Muslims who live amongst the Sinhalese. While the problems of the Southern Muslims are clearly not as immediate as those of the East or the North the insecurity with which many Southern Muslims live in Sinhala majority areas, the incipient violence that flares up at various moments – the incidents of Galle and Mawanella are the most recent—must also be kept in mind when discussing the consequences of Muslim political decisions in the east. A discussion that addresses the issue of Southern Muslim fears as to what they expect the fall out to be from the different positions that are taken by the Muslims in the conflict affected areas would be another means of generating greater consensus amongst the Muslim leadership.    

There should also be an appreciation of a past where coexistence amongst ethnic groups was the norm—especially in the case of Muslims and Tamils in the east. Given the recent developments within Tamil nationalism, the splintering of the LTTE on a regional platform and the emerging discussion of eastern Tamil specificity, the Muslims and the Tamils of the East must realize that they share common interests. In the conceptualising of administrative enclaves there should be a sufficient understanding of the particularly mixed cultural geography of the region and the inevitability of interaction.  Considering the possibility of future peaceful and amicable coexistence is also absolutely essential when conceptualizing such options and must temper feelings of Muslim victimhood that generally underlies such planning.

In the two decades of conflict poverty, inequality lack of access to land and scare resources has been utilized  by armed actors and politicians who “re-present” and liberate poor and socially marginal communities in the language of ethnic liberation. Nationalism denies internal difference and internal diversity within the ethnic group. Recognizing internal regional diversity including poverty and economic inequalities within ethnic groups is necessary for a substantive peace. The regional specificity that was always recognized amongst Muslim and is now slowly becoming institutionalized is a good sign. Now Tamil-Muslim interests as co-regionalists are emerging once again and should also be emphasized. Thus, the envisioning of a future by the Muslims of the NorthEast must necessarily include conceptulizing the position of Tamil and Sinhalese communities, be they the minorities within Muslim majority areas or the majority, in order to prevent replicating the exclusionary policies the Muslims have faced.    

Home