Hegemony and Rebellion: The Sangari and Karuna Rebellions

-- Ahilan Kadirgamar

In November when the President and Prime Minister got entangled in a power struggle, the LTTE leadership boasted about the unity and strength of the Tamil leadership. It was Colonel Karuna himself that said in November 7th a few days after the take over of ministries, "We can remain patient as long as we are strong." That is the self proclaimed 'sole representatives' of the Tamils, were so confident of their hold over the Tamil community, that they ridiculed the South for the differences within the Southern leadership. That any democracy would have differences did not figure into their thinking. But more interestingly the international community in their neo-liberal and neo-colonial garb, so used to dealing with Third World chiefs also seemed to think with the same logic. After all, democracy could not be a consideration for the Third World, were they not promoting and supporting the bombing of Iraq into 'democratic' submission. And particularly where their soldiers were not at risk as in Sri Lanka, why would democracy or pluralism ever become a question. It has always been easier to deal with one chief per community at a time. The LTTE's ridicule of the South did not miss others; it had to say the same thing to the Muslim leadership and the Upcountry Tamil leadership. Who are your sole representatives? And no point in talking to you without your sole representatives!

Then something went miserably wrong. With the announcement of elections, the LTTE's proxy TNA was shaken by a rebellion of its most senior politician, Ananthasangari, the president of the largest Tamil party, the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF). Not only did Ananthasangari openly challenge the LTTE's sole representative claim, he also denied it the use of the TULF symbol, the rising sun. Ananthasangari was joined by other senior Tamil politicians such as former mayor of Jaffna Sellan Kandian. This rebellion within an increasingly manipulated and manufactured political proxy shook Jaffna ideologically. Here were twelve brave unarmed men willing to stand up to the LTTE's guns. They worked out of the very same office which houses the large pictures of their many leaders slain by the LTTE.

But Ananthasangari's rebellion had its limits; he could not find a single man in the East to go on his list. Nor could one blame his supporters in the East, for the East has seen a larger share of the blood bath compared to the North. Even this past elections points to the larger number of political killings as at least two candidates and many more supporters were killed. So, Ananthasangari's rebellion remained a Northern rebellion and that too very much confined to the Jaffna peninsula.

But one did not have to wait very long. The LTTE's military machine itself split in two as Colonel Karuna decided to secede with the Eastern command. As Karuna put out the populist call of Eastern regionalism, it shook the foundations of the extreme Tamil nationalist ideology which had been one of the pillars on which the LTTE stood. Hence the Northern and Eastern rebellions shook the LTTE. The political, military and ideological projects of the LTTE were all shaken.

Where did the LTTE's nation building project go wrong and how did such rapid changes take place? The events leading through the rebellions and the suppression of the rebellions have much to say about the totalitarian limits of the LTTE and the LTTE's use of power. So, how were these rebellions crushed?

In the North, Ananthasangari was confined to his office. His supporters were beaten, harassed and intimidated. The LTTE in the past through targeted killings had made sure that the TULF will have no base and certainly no party machine, other than through itself. There were targeted killings in the East in case anyone forgot who was in charge, and the elections became a carnival of rigging and impersonation. The LTTE proxy TNA won in Jaffna in the style of similar totalitarian regimes around the world, the TNA got 91% of the vote. Despite all that, they missed their bid to sole representation in parliament as EPDP won a sole seat, frustrating the LTTE's two year long sole representation project characterized by numerous political assassinations during the ceasefire.

In the East, Karuna's populist call of Eastern regionalism was aimed at the four constituencies that stood to gain from his rebellion. These were the petty bourgeois and middle class constituencies that resented the historical domination of the East by the Jaffna upper caste elite. The Batticaloa business class, the Eastern University staff and students, the Eastern civil servants and sections of the party machines were the ones that initially supported Karuna. The larger population in the East remained numb to the rebellion, sensing that whether it's the Northern LTTE or the Eastern LTTE, they were shafted one way or the other. The Vanni LTTE leadership then set out to destroy Karuna's base and targeted one from each of the above mentioned constituencies. There were the attempted assassinations of the Eastern academic Thiruchelvam and first Eastern Government Agent Mounagurusamy, the murder of a small businessman, Vellupillai Ganesh and the murder of the popular Eastern politician Rajan Sathiyamoorthy. It was such blatant cruelty in the East that led to the larger population throwing in their support for Karuna. The increasing popular support led to the burning of the Vanni leadership's effigies during the rebellion, something unthinkable few months back. However, Karuna without a financial base (it is hard to tax while pushing a populist line and the East lacked the expatriate base for funds), politically isolated by the Sri Lankan state and international community, nor having the local infrastructure developed to mobilize the people was crippled by the Northern invasion. The Northern LTTE had the advantage of initiating the war with a ruthless drive and without concern for the lives of their fellow cadres, as the international community and the Sri Lankan state quietly watched on. Karuna having counted on and mobilized the support of his cadres' parents now had to answer their calls and cries to disband. If he did not disband, the result was clear, it would be Eastern cadres that would die, whether they were Eastern battalions based in the North and sent by the Vanni leadership or Eastern cadres defending the Eastern Command. So Karuna disbanded and the rebellion ended.

The LTTE's version of the story would be that there were some internal problems, (it would not want to concede that there were rebellions) and they were resolved. Ideologically they would like to claim that Tamil Nationalism has won again and its sole representative status legitimized. That might be a wonderful story for the Tamil media controlled by the gun, but any careful observer of Tamil politics must ask the question, why the rebellions, when nobody considered it possible. The last time the Sri Lankan armed forces attempted a coup was in the early sixties. How did then a totalitarian organization like the LTTE, split so quickly? It points to the lack of safety valves for even marginal reform. When it comes to the LTTE, there will be rebellion because reform stands no chance. The international community should try to curb the LTTE before it can think of transforming the LTTE, that is the lesson the international community needs to learn but will not learn.

There are many lessons for Tamil dissent in looking at how these rebellions were crushed. First, one should not forget the complicity of the international community in the war in the East. Erik Solheim, the Norwegian facilitator said this was an "internal matter" for the LTTE, while the Norwegian led monitoring mission escorted Northern troops to the East and withdrew the monitoring presence from the East, effectively giving the LTTE the license to start the war. Solheim also avoided meeting Ananthasangari, the president of the largest Tamil political party, yet met with LTTE's "political" wing head in Jaffna. UNICEF and other iNGOs were also silent; UNICEF did not even attempt to gain the release of child soldiers from Karuna. There was not one statement of condemnation from the international powers when the war started. They only repeated the mantra calling on the Sri Lankan state and the LTTE to restart the peace process. Nobody wanted to ask, what was the meaning of the peace process when a war was unleashed in Sri Lanka? The war made a mockery of not only the peace process but also all efforts towards rehabilitation. Even in the context of UNICEF's fancy Action Plan, child soldiers were used on both sides during the war. While UNICEF has confirmed that two child soldiers were killed in the war, estimates by activists and news reports put the number at over a hundred children killed. Claymore landmines also seem to have been used. What did the millions of dollars spent and lives risked removing landmines mean if they are removed in one place and used to kill in another? The international community's colonial approach led by the Norwegians claims to be for the peace, but they did not want to criticize their chief on the ground, even in the face of a war.

Second is the troubling role of the Sri Lankan state in the context of the war in the East. The Sri Lankan state watched on as the LTTE moved by sea in violation of the ceasefire agreement to attack the Eastern command. This only exposes the danger of Chandrika's rhetoric of "national security" which was her justification when she took over the three ministries in November, as it does not mean anything for the citizens of the North and East in terms of their human security. In watching the Northern LTTE's move to massacre the Eastern command, the Sri Lankan state had surrendered its responsibility towards its Eastern citizens. This was one step closer to the Chandrika government recognizing the totalitarian "sole representative" claim of the LTTE. The election commissioner despite calls for the annulment of elections in the North did not act on it. The subtle message is that elections in the North can be a farce, and it does affect the state of parliamentary democracy in Sri Lanka.

Third, there are the Tamil pundits, the Tamil Nationalists, not the just the die hard ones that live comfortably in the West and send their children to universities while they call for children in the North and East to die for their die hard cause. Of course, they will soon take battalions from the West to go fight a national liberation war for their less fortunate brethren. I am talking about the so called moderate Tamil Nationalists, the ones who have a ready set of excuses; without the LTTE we will not have any other options (that the LTTE has and continues to crush any alternatives does not cross their minds) and child soldiers are bad but what about the children that the Sri Lankan army massacres. Well, they remained silent and will continue to remain silent even in the face of Tamil children being used to massacre Tamil children.

The LTTE may have ambitions of transforming itself from a de facto totalitarian state to a legitimate totalitarian state. In requesting legitimacy from its colonial supporters, the international community, it may have to pretend towards hegemonic control over the North and East. But the reality remains that even a pretense of consensus is not possible where every challenge can only be dealt with by its guns. That poses a problem to the LTTE's pseudo-democracy selling colonial supporters. Because spilt blood sticks and stinks, and cover up beyond a limit is not possible!

Were these rebellions in vain? The LTTE may slaughter its way into parliament and massacre its way to rule the East, but every rebellion leaves its mark. The East is East, and now lost for good from the LTTE. The families of the cadres in East are defiant that their children should not be re-recruited. The families of the "martyrs" and cadres were the main social base of the LTTE. It has always depended on the families and Karuna mobilized them as well. But now that social base in the East has been lost. In the North, Sangari and what remains of the dissenting parties may have hopefully learned the lesson about the need for a United Front for Tamil Democracy, a front that would hopefully be internally democratic and also attempt to democratize the North and East. Sangari's rebellion and the ideological space that was created in the North will be there for democratic alternatives. Similarly the social base mobilized by Karuna will provide the space on the ground for resistance. Any attempt by the LTTE's towards totalitarian control, and particularly its old practices of child recruitment and extortion are bound to face stiff resistance in the East. Successful or not, these rebellion and their legacy have severely undermined the hegemony of sole representation. Resentment and dissent will simmer among the masses and openings and resistance there will emerge. But one thing seems to be clear, if there is to be any real change in the North and East, it will come from the ground up.

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