lines
co-editor, Vasuki Nesiah worked on the following Q and As with
activist-intellectuals Lionel Bopage, based in Canberra and Ketheshwaran (Kethesh) Loganathan,
based in Colombo.
Lionel Bopage
is former general secretary of the JVP and former member of the District
Development Council, Galle. Associated with the JVP since 1968, he
resigned in 1984. He is currently a member of the Executive Committee,
Friends for Peace in Sri Lanka, based in Canberra, Australia. Kethesh Loganathan is currently Director of
the Centre for Policy Alternatives (CPA) and Head of its Conflict & Peace
Analysis Unit. During the 1983 –‘94 period, he was a member of the EPRLF and
partook in the negotiation processes spanning the Thimpu Peace Talks of 1985 to
the Mangala Moonesinghe Parliamentary Select Committee of 1992. During his
involvement in the Tamil national movement as a member of the EPRLF he did not
contest in either the N-E Provincial Councils elections of 1988 or in the
subsequent parliamentary elections of 1989 and 1994. He resigned from EPRLF in
1995. The views expressed by him are in
his personal capacity.
Kethesh and Lionel, both found
their home in youth militant movements that fundamentally transformed
the political culture of Sri Lanka – one from the South, and
the other from the North. Within the EPRLF and JVP, they represented
voices of integrity and pluralism that questioned party dogma,
resisted the expedient, and promoted internal democracy – but
they also represent a fundamental commitment to struggle against
the social injustices that birthed these political organizations.
Holding onto both these elements, we approached these
Q and As with an interest in exploring the alternative paths
(lost paths?) that were not taken – a lens into the past that
may shed some light onto the future.
Q&A with Ketheshwaran (Kethesh
)Loganathan
Q: Could you reflect back on the
origins of Tamil militant movement and speak on the mood of the 70s?
A: Although Tamil nationalist politics was already on the political and
electoral agenda in Sri Lanka from the time of independence, due to
discrimination in the spheres of language and employment which largely affected
the professional or the middle class,
the Tamil militant movement in the 70s was characterized by extreme
youth alienation stemming from discrimination in the sphere of education, most
inappropriately labeled by the Government as “standardization”. This coupled
with increasing youth unemployment at the national level led to the youth, in
particular, school students to actively engage themselves in the Tamil
nationalist struggle. Undoubtedly the increase in State violence, anti-Tamil
riots and the recanting of memories of discrimination by the elders at home as
well as teachers at schools would have contributed to the politicization of
Tamil school students. Key
personalities like Sivakumaran, Pathmanabha, Pirabhakaran, Varatharajaperumal,
Sritharan (Sugu) either dropped out of school or used the school as a medium of
struggle. The formation of the Tamil Student Federation and later the General Union Eelam Students were
manifestations of the role being played by the Tamil youths, in particular
school students.
While there were instances of direct action involving bank heists and
assassination of Tamil politicians belonging to the UNP or the SLFP as well as
Tamil policemen, there were also moves to link the militant youth movement to
class-based struggles involving landless agricultural workers, poor peasants
and fisherfolks. The EPRLF through its student wing the General Union of Eelam
Students, and other frontal organizations, for instance, was in the forefront
of social mobilization based on class.
The above combination of the ideological and direct militant actions was
also seen as a threat by the traditional parliamentary political parties (i.e.
TULF and ACTC) and landed and propertied interests in Tamil society. While the TULF, for instance, was engaged in
ethno-populist rhetoric as a means of electoral mobilization, it also felt insecure in the face of youth militancy with strong ideological
overtones. There were instances where the TULF were seen to be collaborating
with the State to contain the militant tendency, while at the same time
engaging in high voltage nationalist rhetoric and propaganda.
Q: How would you characterize
the historical record of the Tamil militant movement? How was the political
landscape of contemporary politics shaped by the nature of Tamil militancy?
A; As I had mentioned in my
response to the previous question, the origins of the Tamil militant movement,
stemming from extreme youth alienation, was typically fired by idealism based
on egalitarianism and selflessness. In addition to Tamil nationalist
sentiments, youth militancy was also fuelled by the influence of
Marxist-Leninist ideology, which was prevalent even before the 70s, as well as
the increasing influence of liberation
theology from Latin America and the national
liberation struggles in Africa and Indo-China. Hence there was a strong
anti-Imperialist and an egalitarian content in the Tamil youth militant
movement. The virtual one-to-one
relationship between caste and class, particularly in the Jaffna peninsula,
also inevitably brought in the caste factor into the Tamil militant movement.
However, the militant youth
movement with a strong egalitarian and
ideological content soon became subordinated to the compulsions of Tamil Resistance in the face of increasing
state repression. This was particularly evident after the firing and baton
charging at the International Tamil Conference in Jaffna in 1974, the anti-Tamil riots of 1977, the passage and
the ferocious implementation of the Prevention of Terrorism Act of 1979, the
burning down of the Jaffna Library in 1981 and of course the state-sponsored
anti-Tamil pogrom of July 1983. The
militarization of the ethnic conflict, with India emerging as a rear base to
the Tamil Resistance, led to the traditional parliamentary party, the TULF,
giving way to the “boys”. This was
particularly evident at the Thimpu Peace Talks of 1985. Thus began the struggle
for legitimacy by the militant
organizations.
However, the killing of the TELO
leader, Sri Sabaratnam and 200 of TELO cadres by the LTTE in the streets and
the fields of Jaffna in mid-1986 and the attack on EPRLF in December 1986
signaled the beginning of bloody
fratricidal conflicts which was to consume the lives of hundreds of Tamil youths who lost their lives
fighting one another than in fighting the State. In fact, more Tamil youths
were killed in fratricidal conflicts during 1986-87 than in combat with the
security forces. This was despite the fact that only an year earlier the LTTE
joined the united front, the Eelam National Liberation Front(ENLF) comprising
the EPRLF, EROS and TELO which had been formed in 1984. This was also despite the fact that all four
organizations (i.e. LTTE, EPRLF, EROS and TELO) and the PLOTE and TULF together
formulated a common negotiating position at the Thimpu Peace Talks of July and
August 1985. The collectively called themselves the ‘Tamil Delegation” while
making joint written submissions at the talks. This included the formulation
and submission of the `Thimpu
Principles’.
In addition to the fratricidal conflicts, the subsequent killing of
Tamil intellectuals and politicians (eg.Amirthalingam, Pathmanabha, Rajani
Thiranagama and Neelan Tiruchelvam) who did not subscribe to the LTTE’s way of
thinking and doing created a vacuum in the political landscape of Tamil
politics, as well narrowed the scope for involvement by the intelligentsia.
But, it would be incorrect to say that the LTTE was the sole
perpetrator. The internal killings that took place within PLOTE during the 80s,
the assassination of TULF politicians
Dharmalingam, Alalasundram and others by TELO in mid 1985, the forced conscription of adults and children by the
EPRLF and its allies in the post Indo-Lanka Accord and the killing of sympathizers of the LTTE, the hegemonic politics ad thuggery of PLOTE
in Vavuniya during the early 90s, the rampage of the EPDP as a
“para-military” during the early 90s under the patronage of President Premadasa and the use of violence
to silence its critics even while functioning as a parliamentary party, all
contributed to the rot that began to set into Tamil militancy and created
distortions in their transformation into mainstream democratic parties.
Successive governments and their military-intelligence apparatus also
contributed to the rot through the creation of “para-militaries” which were
accountable to no one, but to their “handlers”. The tendency by the Sri Lankan State to use the ex-Tamil militant
organizations as instruments in the military campaign against the LTTE, instead
of empowering them as political parties by evolving a package based on
substantial autonomy for the North-East, further discredited the non-LTTE Tamil
organizations. They came to be stigmatized as “para-militaries”.
In short, all of the above (i.e. the hegemonic campaign of the LTTE and
the self-seeking collaborationist politics of the other ex-militant
organizations, contributed to the rot that afflicts contemporary Tamil
politics.
Q: What were the internal
debates and tensions regarding alternative paths? What were the roads not
taken? Looking back with the benefit of hindsight, what were the critical
turning points that may have charted a different course for politics in the
Tamil community today?
One area of difference was on
the relations between the people and the organization. The LTTE consciously relegated the people to the
state of mute “observers” who would contribute resources and manpower as and
when their “saviours” sought it. The more left-oriented organizations like the
PLOTE and EPRLF held the notions of
“People’s War” and “mass-based” armed
struggle. Both were in a way extreme
positions which either led to militarism and nihilism, as in the case of the
LTTE, or “revolutionary romanticism”, as in the case of EPRLF and PLOTE. Ultimately, myopic organizational interests
was the winner – and the people the losers.
Another debate within the Tamil
militant movement was regards the ultimate goal. While organizations like LTTE
and TELO were firmly committed to the creation of a separate State of Tamil
Eelam and were fired by Tamil nationalist fervour, organizations like EPRLF,
and PLOTE were more amenable to building links with the left, secular and
progressive forces in the south, and were open to “alternative” paths. However, the failure of left politics in the
south and the hegemony of Sinhala chauvinism only served to strengthen its
mirror image – namely, Tamil chauvinism.
In this context, the left agenda within the Tamil national movement
never stood a chance. In due course, even organizations like the EPRLF which
was committed to seeking alternatives to a separate State by linking with
“revolutionary” forces in the south, which in themselves were weak and
fragmented, were compelled to adopt a Tamil nationalist position. But, even
here they were no match to the “authentic” nationalists and ended up falling
between two stools.
On the other hand, the “respectable” and seasoned Tamil parliamentary
parties like the TULF and the ACTC which were seeking to ride on the back of
the Tamil militants found themselves thrown off their backs and clinging
instead to their tails. The present
“Tiger by the Tail” situation that the TULF and ACTC find themselves in, is a
case in point.
Q: Could you highlight the
issues around which there were key debates/divisions. For instance, class,
Caste, Gender, Upcountry tamils, Organizational Structure and Relationship
between militarization and politics.
A: My response here again refers
to the late 70s and 80s (i.e. the formative stages of the Tamil militant
organizations) and may not be of relevance today.
Organizations like the LTTE and TELO, which have a common “heritage”,
structured themselves as primarily military organizations. Politics was
subordinate to the military. The EPRLF, on the other hand, created a military
wing which was under the direct control of the political leadership. However,
this eventually led to tensions between these two with the militarization of
the conflict. This could also explain as to why the LTTE and TELO proved to be
militarily superior to the EPRLF. On the other hand, EPRLF was clearly ahead of
the other organizations when it came to mass mobilization. However, following
the militarization of the conflict in the aftermath of July 1983 anti-Tamil
pogrom, political and mass mobilization
came to be subordinated to the gun and armed propaganda..
Another area of difference related to territory. The EPRLF for instance
viewed the Plantation Tamils as a people who were exploited as a working class
and oppressed on the basis of their ethnicity. Its programme was based on the
right of the plantation Tamils to fight for their rights while remaining in
their own `traditional homeland' (i.e. the Up-country) – and not to be used as cannon fodder to the Tamil nationalist
movement or to be settled in the North-East as a buffer against Sinhala
colonization as some Tamil NGOs with a political agenda were engaged in.
However, it must be mentioned that the ferocity of the anti-Tamil riots that affected
the Plantation areas in 1977, 1979, 1981 and 1983 led to an inevitable exodus
of the plantation Tamils to the Vanni. They were over-night converted from the
status of a plantation proletariat to
that of a pauperised peasantry and landless agricultural workers. It is this
situation that also enabled the LTTE to later recruit them into their fighting
forces.
Q: If we were today trying to reflect back on traditions of dissent and
emancipation in Tamil politics to inspire a more democratic and inclusive path
for the future – which are the moments – or who are the individuals – you would
highlight?
A: The individual I would highlight is
Pathmanabha who was a revolutionary humanist who gave emphasis to love
of the People as opposed to the Soil. The moment I would highlight is the when
Pathmanabha prevailed on Pirabhakaran to join the united front (i.e. ENLF) in
forging an inclusive and a democratic Tamil alliance. But, this alliance was
not to last. His assassination by the LTTE
is the cruel destiny that has befallen an entire people – the destiny of bloodletting within the Tamil community.
Q. Today bitterness and distrust between Tamils with affiliations to
different groups appears to be as deep as that between Tamils and the Sri
Lankan State. Does it suggest that Tamil politics focused too much on ethnicity
as the principal reference point for diversity that was relevant for
minorities?
A: Yes and No. The bitterness is evident and palpable – and I suppose is
also manifest in my answer to the earlier question But, it would be incorrect to say that the bitterness and
distrust that has arisen and the decay that has set into the Tamil national
movement is due to an excessive reliance on ethnicity. Ethnicity would cease to
be factor only when the Ethnic Question is resolved in manner that is equitable
and just. That is more so the reason that I would stress on the importance of
the resolution of the Ethnic Question. This does not mean that I believe in a stage by stage theory where
the resolution of the ethnic conflict is seen by some as the pre-requisite for
the democratization and the healing process within the Tamil community. On the
contrary, these are the two sides of the same struggle and constitutes the real
challenge that all of us have to take
up.
Just as much as how peace is indivisible – so is democracy and social
justice.
Ketheshwaran(Kethesh)
Loganathan is currently Director of the Centre for Policy Alternatives (CPA)
and Head of its Conflict & Peace Analysis Unit. He was during the period
1983 -94, a member of the EPRLF and partook in the negotiation processes
spanning the Thimpu Peace Talks of 1985 to the Mangala Moonesinghe
Parliamentary Select Committee of 1992. During his involvement in the Tamil
national movement as a member of the EPRLF he did not contest in either the N-E
Provincial Councils elections of 1988 or in the subsequent parliamentary
elections of 1989 and 1994. He resigned from EPRLF in 1995.
The
views expressed by him are in his personal capacity.
