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Categories, Identity and Difference: Buddhist Monks (bhikkus) and Peace in Lanka

 

Paper presented at a Panel on Social Cleavage, Hierarchy and Difference at a Conference on Sri Lanka: Dynamics of Violence, Challenges of Peace, Cornell University, February 7 –8, 2003

 

-- Chandra R. de Silva

 

Let me begin by saying how happy and honored I am to be with you to explore questions relating to what the conference organizers have aptly named the ‘Dynamics of Violence’ and the ‘Challenges of Peace’. These words reflect the dangers and challenges that we face in the world today; dangers and challenges that confront us as we pursue a quest for stability, peace and serenity in an environment that is fluid and constantly mutating. Therefore, while I begin by reinforcing what many others have said - how important these questions are in the context of peace negotiations in Sri Lanka and against the background of the enhanced concern for global security in the wake of the incidents of September 11, 2001, we also need to keep three fairly obvious considerations in mind.  Firstly, these problems of violence and peace that we are discussing today are, in some senses, perennial problems. Secondly, as post-modernists have correctly emphasized, the analyses we offer are not only context specific but emerge from, and are embedded in, our own respective social and cultural heritages. Finally, the solutions or palliatives we offer must be recognized as ephemeral because the social structures, identities and cleavages on which they are based are themselves changing as we speak. As John Gray pointed out in relation to politics  ‘. . . no settlement is final, and only the provisional is permanent; so the legal framework in which any particular political settlement finds embodiment will be subject to recurrent revision, and eventual breakdown.’ [i]

 

Let me begin with the concept of difference. If you analyze this concept as a theoretical construct, it soon becomes evident that it is based on the assumption of the existence of categories that are defined as self-evident: Sinhala Buddhist, Sinhala Christian, Muslim, Hindu Tamil and so on. But we know that concepts of identity are fluid, multiple and contested. For instance, there were contentious debates in the 1980s as to whether the Jayawardane government was “Buddhist” and whether the monks who supported the opposition Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) were good monks or “criminals.”[ii] It is therefore clear that we begin not with a single monolithic group of Sinhalas or even one group of Sinhala Buddhists or one unit of Buddhist monks but multiple groups in very different positions in the social and political hierarchy engaged in spirited contestations and sometimes slightly shifting positions to gain political or moral advantage.[iii]

 

This does not mean that we are debarred from using categories. Indeed, many of us use categories on a routine basis in the academic world and political and social leaders have shown us that such categories - ethnic and religious - can be effective mechanisms as individual leaders or groups use such concepts – sometimes called ‘strategic essentialisms’- to make their way up the hierarchy.[iv] What I wish to emphasize is merely the malleability of the categories we use.

 

In the rest of my presentation I will try to examine how heritage, hierarchy, organization and educational background as well as changing perceptions about others, create and transform ideologies of difference. Due to constraints of time, I will confine my analyses to one group - the sangha or order of Buddhist monks (bhikkus). However, much of what I argue can be applied to a greater or lesser degree to all kinds of ethnic and social groups.

 

In much of the recent literature on contemporary Sri Lanka, including some of my own writings, there have been some critical remarks on the attitudes of many Buddhist monks in relation to the civil conflict in Sri Lanka.[v] The emphasis in this paper is different. I start with the assumption that in order to promote rational discourse we need to look at why people think the way they do or at least what promotes them to articulate the views they express. If this is true, examining how people get their ideas and ideals and what factors reinforce or modify them is not merely an academic exercise but a crucial part of the peace process itself.

 

I will begin with the concept of a unitary Sri Lanka. This is a policy that is often cited as one that most Buddhist monks (and indeed, most contemporary Sinhalas) support and it is viewed as a major obstacle to a political settlement with Tamil leaders. I will argue that there is much in the tradition and history of the sangha that inclines them to value unity (eksathkama) but that the equation of unity and a unitary state (ekeeya rajaya) is a more recent phenomenon.  I also argue that there is some leeway to affect opinion if we make distinctions between a single state in Sri Lanka and a unitary state in Sri Lanka.

 

Ideally, each Buddhist monk is a truth-seeker on an individual journey. Buddhist texts consistently urge individuals to deal with others as individuals deserving equal treatment,[vi] not as parts of religious or social collectivities. On the other hand, there is also the concept of the sangha as a single indivisible organization. There are canonical injunctions against causing a schism among bhikkus.[vii] This religious tradition is reinforced by perceptions of history. The Sinhala Buddhist chronicle, the Mahavamsa extols Buddhist rulers who unified the sangha and enforced the decisions of ecclesiastical tribunals. Thus, appeals for unity  (eksathkama) have great resonance. Notwithstanding the ideal of the monk as an individual sojourner on a quest for liberation, the ideal of unity creates suspicion regarding policies that are perceived as producing division and discord, both among the sangha and in the political system. The aversion to discord is heightened by a perception that ‘disunity’ or the disconnect between the sangha and the people of Lanka was something that was deliberately fostered in colonial times. When we connect this to the acceptance by most Sinhala Buddhists that one of the roles of the Buddhist monk is to defend the Sinhala Buddhist heritage[viii] we can see why many Buddhist monks are cautious about plans for political devolution.

 

This caution (and fear) springs not only from history and tradition but also from lived experience. Whatever the perceptions of outsiders, monks often see themselves as very loosely organized, weak and prone to disunity.  The number of Buddhist monks in Sri Lanka is relatively small, around 37,000,[ix] and organizationally they are divided into three major orders or nikayas:[x] Siyam, Amarapura and Ramaņņa. Overall, the Siyam Nikaya has over 18,000 monks or about half of the Buddhist monks in Sri Lanka and has close ties with the goyigama caste to which the majority of Sinhalas belong. The Siyam Nikaya has two major units (Malwatta and Asgiriya) and five others that are aligned to one or other of the major units. There are no major doctrinal divisions within the Siyam Nikaya and, on the whole, the leadership of the Maha Nayakas of Malwatta and Asgiriya is rarely challenged.[xi]

 

The second major order, the Amarapura Nikaya has about 12,000 monks.  Founded in the first decade of the nineteenth century as an effort to open the sangha to more individuals outside the goyigama caste, the nikaya grew swiftly, but later split into many divisions due to geography, caste identity[xii] and other disputes. The push for unity was perhaps strongest in this nikaya because in the 1940s, the Amarapura Nikaya comprised over thirty separate branches, each with its own mahanayaka.  An effort to unite these subgroups succeeded in 1969 and today the Amarapura Nikaya has a unified leadership.[xiii] It might be worth remembering that the present head of the Amarapura Nikaya Ven, Madihe Pannasiha, was a leading figure in the movement for unity.

 

The smallest of the three major nikayas is the Ramaņņa. It is estimated to have between 6000 and 8000 monks.[xiv]  However, unlike the other two nikayas, the Ramaņņa Nikaya is structurally unitary, with a single mahanayaka, and is organized into regional units. It is particularly strong in the southwest, but has expanded into other regions in the last century.  While it has no specific caste affiliations, many of its prominent lay supporters are drawn from the karava caste.

 

While many of the distinctions between the nikayas have become muted in the second half of the twentieth century - for instance monks routinely live for periods in temples belonging to other orders other than their own for purposes like education – discomfort about possible dangers to disunity remain. There is extensive support among bhikkus for state support of religion[xv] but one of the major concerns within the sangha is an effort to avoid division through party politics. Thus, the 1993 Constitution of the Amarapura Nikaya specifically forbids the use of official titles in the organization when participation in political activity.[xvi]

 

All of the above would throw some light on why the leadership of the sangha opposed President Kumaratunga’s negotiation with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam (LTTE) in the 1990s and refused to support her proposals for the devolution of power.[xvii] Up to early 2002, the mahanayakas had argued that there should not be any talks with the LTTE (which they viewed as a terrorist organization) and that the solution to the civil conflict was the eradication of terrorism. By mid 2002, however, the Wickremesinghe government seemed to have succeeded in persuading the mahanayakas that its negotiations with the LTTE were on the basis of a single country and thenceforth, the mahanayakes have remained united in support of the peace process.[xviii] The concept of the unity of Lanka has been separated from that of a unitary state. I will return to this question later on.

 

Let me now turn to a different consideration. It is not just that tradition and recent experience have provided a basis for a fear by Buddhist monks. One might also argue that change comes slowly in the sangha because bhikku organization encourages the primacy of more conservative elements through emphasis on seniority. It is true that there are some elements of democracy and decentralization within the nikayas. Temple properties are owned not by the nikaya, but rather by the chief incumbents of temples. In many cases, the chief incumbents of temples choose a close relative as their ‘senior’ pupil so that pupillary succession ensures that a temple remains within the control of a single extended family.

 

Nevertheless, seniority and respect among peers is a key factor in advancement in the nikaya hierarchies. The Ramaņņa Nikaya is arguably the most democratic of the nikayas. It allows a monk with three months residence in an area to have a vote in the Pradesheeya Sangha Sabha (Area Council). However, the President and Vice President have to be Maha Staviras or monks with at least ten years of experience after their upasampada ordination. Traditionally, all other office bearers also come from such senior ranks. Almost half of the central Ruling Council (Palaka Sangha Sabha) of the nikaya is made up of ex-officio members.[xix] Thus, while all office bearers, including the mahanayakas, face elections before appointment, monks are usually socialized into the prevailing structure.

           

As Tessa Bartholomeusz and I have explained elsewhere,[xx] developments in the 1990s led to an enhanced ability of the leaders of the sangha to work across nikayas. Up to 1990 politicians could seek support from chief monks through individual contacts and acts of patronage. In that year came the formation of the Supreme Advisory Council (Uttarithara Anusasaka Mandalaya) to advise the President of Sri Lanka on all matters related to Buddhism.[xxi] All monks in this Council were to be appointed on the recommendations of the four mahanayakas (of the Asgiriya and Malwatta chapters of the Siyam Nikaya and of the Amarapura and Ramaņņa Nikayas). The Supreme Advisory Council met many times between 1990 and 1997 and these meetings gave the leaders of the sangha more experience in working together on issues of common interest across nikaya lines. Thus, when the leaders of the sangha resigned en masse in 1997 due to a disagreement with President Kumaratunga, they were able to continue to meet periodically and issue joint declarations on issues of national significance. It is thus more likely today than twenty years ago that despite divisions in the rank and file of the sangha, the mahanayakas will speak with one voice on issues that seem important to them.

 

It might appear that these developments have given rise to a more secure leadership within the Buddhist sangha but this is not necessarily the case. Social changes in Sri Lanka in the last few generations have contributed to increasing dissident voices within the bhikku order. Some of the divisions are doctrinal. For example there have been disputes about the ordination of women and the acceptance of Mahayana doctrines and practices. More important are social divisions. There are significant rifts between monks who have received university training and some exposure to left wing ideas and others who have had a more traditional education. Some temples are richly endowed and others are very poor and for a long time there has been an undercurrent of social criticism that was partly responsible for the involvement of many young monks in the JVP insurgency of the 1980s. There has also been the rapid rise of extra-nikaya organizations. Some of them have an ephemeral existence but are often quite important for short periods.

 

A good example of the swift emergence of such an organization is the emergence of the Jathika Sangha Sabhava (JSS) in 1996.[xxii] One of the major objectives in creating this organization of monks was the desire to have a national organization of bhikkus who would become a factor in national policy-making while remaining independent of all political parties. In fact, monks belonging to political parties are specifically excluded from the JSS. The list of office bearers and active leaders of the JSS included some of the most influential monks in the country.[xxiii] The JSS has not only campaigned against the constitutional proposals of the Kumaratunga government,[xxiv] but it has also involved itself in other issues, such as opposition to the privatization and exploitation of the mineral deposits at Eppawela.

 

Six years later when the Wickremasinghe government gained the support of the mahanayakas for negotiations with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam (LTTE), and some members of the JSS expressed tacit support for the policy, there arose the Jathika Sangha Sammelanaya (JSSam) or the National Conference of Monks.[xxv] The JSSam organized a number of public meetings, rituals and processions to galvanize opposition to the de-proscription of the LTTE and the establishment of an interim council dominated by the LTTE to rule the northeast.[xxvi]

 

Thus, despite their new connections, the legitimacy of the traditional leadership and their very identity as ‘true Buddhist leaders’ is open to being challenged. I will present one example to illustrate this last point.  In late April and early May 2002, there was intense debate in Sri Lanka as to whether the proscription on the LTTE should be lifted and indeed, whether the February Memorandum of Understanding between the Sri Lanka Government and the LTTE should be supported by the sangha. After initially opposing the move,[xxvii] in June 2002, the mahanayakas issued a statement from Tokyo, Japan supporting the peace process because the Wickremasinghe government assured them that all negotiations were conditional on a single state of Sri Lanka.[xxviii]

 

It is the sequel to the process that is enlightening. In his criticism of the reversal of the mahanayakes’ decision, Ven. Akuretiye Nanda, former Vice-Chancellor of the University of Buddhist and Pali Studies linked the change of heart of the mahanayaka of Malwatta to a gift of fifty-three million rupees given to the Temple of the Tooth and the Siyam Nikaya about this time.[xxix] In a subsequent interview, Ven. Nanda, co-President of the Jathika Sangha Sammelanaya, pointed out that even a lay Buddhist observing the eight precepts (let alone a chief monk) was prohibited from accepting gold and silver. He also indicated his revulsion at the practice of mahanayakas accepting luxury cars bought with public money, a practice that had prevailed under the previous government.[xxx] In essence, this was a challenge to the Buddhist identity of the traditional leaders of the sangha.

           

In a publication that I co-authored with Tessa Bartholomeusz two years ago, we argued that ‘we are what we know’; that knowledge defines and forms our identity.[xxxi]  It is well known that the political culture of a group is fashioned by a variety of influences, including the media, but we also know that much of the information we receive is often processed and analyzed through conceptual frameworks that are developed early in life. Most of the sangha has been educated with a world-view that has not only romanticized a mythical, ideal past[xxxii] but one that has developed a perception of threats (from the Christian West as well as from non‑Buddhist minorities, particularly Tamils) which has hardened attitudes against change.  Thus, we do need to pay some attention to the organization of the education and training of Buddhist monks in Sri Lanka.

 

Whatever be the nikaya affiliation of the Buddhist monk, they receive knowledge through a common system supported by the state. Most novice monks begin their instruction under a senior ordained monk but after a few years they often attend a pirivena.[xxxiii] I have discussed the limited nature of the pirivena curriculum elsewhere.[xxxiv] We need to be aware that the pirivena curriculum does not include Science and does not include ‘Social Studies’ after the initial five years. There is virtually nothing about Islam or Christianity or about Tamil and Muslim culture or a western language in the curriculum. There are about 25,000 Buddhist monks receiving education through this system. Suffice it to say here that the education that monks receive gives them very limited knowledge about the culture and religious beliefs of the minorities in Sri Lanka.

 

The facilities afforded to them are among the poorest in the country. The teachers are badly paid and often lack training. This is happening at a time when the Buddhist laity is receiving a somewhat different exposure to modern education and when education in and through English is being fostered by mushrooming ‘International Schools’.[xxxv] Monks might be forgiven for feeling that they are becoming increasingly marginalized in a changing society.

 

In view of all that I have said what is indeed remarkable is that a number of bhikkus who have spoken out in terms of their commitment to peace and their readiness to support a negotiated solution to the current civil war.[xxxvi] Clearly there are other areas that need to be addressed in the peace process[xxxvii] and as I emphasized at the outset, the attitudes of the bhikkus towards the peace process are complex and varied. However, one clear message emerges from this analysis. If the Buddhist monks are to play a key role in sustaining the peace process we certainly need to pay much greater attention to broadening the training of young Buddhist monks. I suggest this not because I am aiming at changing their world view through a broader education but rather to ensure that whatever view they take is based firmly on the best information available. As David Scott argued ‘What we ought to be systematically exploring in Sri Lanka are ways and means of inventing, cultivating and institutionalising cultural-political spaces in which groups (“minorities” as well as the “majority” – though in my view this entire language of number ought to be put aside as irrelevant) can formulate and articulate their moral-political concerns and their self-governing claims in the (natural and conceptual) languages of their respective historical traditions.’[xxxviii] In other words, what we need is a framework that enables continuous renegotiation of the claims of historical (ethnic) communities as well as of other economic and social groups.[xxxix]

 

In other words what we should be aiming at is not the exclusion or vilification of views we do not agree with, or the total exclusion of religious, historical and cultural concerns from the body politic. We should rather strive to build structures through which constantly changing ‘differences’ of all kinds might be constantly articulated, defined and mutually comprehended. This is a key task that we need to work on if we are to build on and preserve that elusive peace.[xl]


 

TABLE 1: BUDDHIST MONKS IN SRI LANKA  (c. 1995)

(Estimates from data at Ministry of Buddha Sasana)

 

 

NAME OF NIKAYA

 TEMPLES

 MONKS

SIYAMOPALI

6018

18,780

Malvatu Parshavaya (including Sri Rohana Parshavaya)

4923

14944

Asgiri Parshavaya

565

1383

Rangiri Dambulu Parshavaya

?

200(?)

Mahavihara Vansika Vanavasa Nikaya

71

889

Kotte Sri Kalyani Saamagri Nikaya,

85

230

Sri Kalyani Saamagri Dharma Maha Sangha Sabhava

352

1056

Uve Siyamopali

22

78

RAMANNA

1117

5048

Sri Lanka Ramanna

1045

4711

Sr Kalyani Yogarama Sansthava

72

337

AMARAPURA

2154

7064

Sri Saddhammavansa-

367

704

Mulavansika-

130

459

Amarapura (Ambagahapiya Parshavaya)-

132

407

Udarata-

335

973

Amarapura-

125

473

Sri Dharmarakshitha-

141

935

Sri Saddhammavansa (Rasssagala Parshavaya)-

60

158

Ariyavamsa Saddhammayuththika-

180

660

Saddhammayuththika (Matara)-

96

292

Vajiravansa-

38

97

Dambulu Paramparayattha-

34

77

Udarata Saamagri Sangha Sabhava-

33

126

 Sri Lanka Swejin-

29

152

Saddhammavansa (Ekneligoda Parshavaya)-

32

62

Chulagandhi-

93

404

Sri Sambuddha Sasanodhaya Sangha Sabhawa-

10

52

Mmrammavansabhidhaja Sri Saddhammayuththika-

33

86

Uva-

60

86

Kalyanavansika Sri Dharmarama Saddhammayuththika-

24

58

Uva Udukinda-

12

84

Amarapura Kalyanavansa

190

719

 

9289

30,892

 


[i] John Gray, Enlightenment’s Wake: Politics and Culture at the Close of the Modern Age, London: Routledge, 1995, p. 128.

[ii] Ananda Abeysekera, ‘The Saffron Army, Violence and Terrorism: Buddhism, Identity and Difference in Sri Lanka, Numen, Vol. 48, 2001.pp. 1-46

[iii] See Chandra R. de Silva, “The Plurality of Buddhist Fundamentalism: An Inquiry into Views Among Buddhist Monks in Sri Lanka,’ Buddhist Fundamentalism and Minority Identities in Sri Lanka, op.cit., pp.53-73. For an excellent analysis of the shifting configurations of identity see Ananda Abeysekera, Colors of the Robe: Religion, Identity and Difference, Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 2002.

[iv] See Charles Briggs, ‘The Politics of Discursive Authority in Research on the “Invention of Tradition,” Cultural Anthropology, Vol. 11 (4) pp. 435-469.

[v] H. L. Seneviratne, The Work of Kings: The New Buddhism in Sri Lanka, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999; Stanley J. Tambiah, Buddhism Betrayed? Religion, Politics and Violence in Sri Lanka, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992; Bartholomeusz and de Silva, Buddhist Fundamentalism and Minority Identities in Sri Lanka, op.cit.,

[vi] Of course, the ideal is not always achieved. For instances when contemporary Buddhist monks looked down on ‘low-caste’ drummers see, Susan A. Reed, Performing Respectability: The Berava, Middle-Class Nationalism and the Classicization of Kandyan Dance in Sri Lanka,’ Cultural Anthropology, Vol. 17 (2), 2002, pp. 246-277.

[vii] Ideas on unity are underwritten by the Pali Canon, particularly in the images of the ancient Buddhist community of the Lichchavis, which were known for its unified stance that had positive political consequences. 

[viii] See Tessa Bartholomeusz, In Defense of Dharma: Just-War Ideology in Buddhist Sri Lanka, London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2002.

[ix]These figure is extrapolated from a three-page typed report released by Anunayaka Kotugoda Dhammawasa, Mala Lekhakadikari of the Amarapura Sangha Sabhava dated 29 July 1999 which estimates the total at 34,000. About two thirds - 25,000 - are fully ordained and the rest are novices (samaneras). See Table 1 for figures in 1995.

[x] The term nikaya is used to denote a body of monks that holds independent higher ordination (upasampada) ceremonies but also for a collection of such bodies that have elements of common origin or common governance. Ordination confers the status of a monk (bhikku) to a novice (samanera). A novice can be initiated by a single bhikku but five bhikkus are needed for higher ordination (upasampada).

[xi]For a perceptive analysis of a rare instance of such a challenge leading to the emergence of the Rangiri Dambulu Parshavaya, see H. L. Seneviratne, The Work of Kings, op cit, pp. 250-271. For a brief survey of the Siyam Nikaya see, Lakdiva Sanga Parapura, eds. Kesbewe Wimalananda and G. H. Kahanda, Colombo: Ministry of Buddha Sasana, 1995.

[xii]For instance, some Amarapura nikayas have been traditionally identified with specific castes; e.g. the karava and salagama castes.

[xiii] See Buddhavansaya, Sasanavansaya ha Amarapuravansaya, ed. Madihe Pannasiha, Maharagama: Sasana Sevaka Samithiya, 1990.

[xiv] In 1988, Mahanayaka Poththewela Pannasara (1986-) said that nikaya had 7500 monks in 2000 temples. Ceylon Daily News Oct 31, 1988.

[xv] On this question see Chandra R. de Silva, ‘State Support for Religion in Sri Lanka: Some Ideological and Policy Issues,’ The Post-Colonial States of South Asia: Democracy, Identity, Development and Security, ed. Amita Shastri and A. Jeyaratnam Wilson, London: Curzon, 2001, pp. 183-195.

[xvi] Sri Lanka Amarapura Maha Sangha Sabhava: Vyastha Malava, Mt. Lavinia: Sri Devi Printers 1993, p. 24.

[xvii] See Ven. Akuretiye Nanda, An Analysis of Statements Issued by the Mahanayakas on the North-East Problem of Sri Lanka, International Conference on Buddhism and Conflict in Sri Lanka, Bath Spa University College, Bath UK, 28 June-30 June 2002. The paper analyses ten statements made between 1999 and April 2002.

[xviii] See Statement issued by the Mahanayakas in Tokyo, Japan, Daily News, June 5, 2002

[xix] Sri Lanka Ramanna Maha Nikaya: Katikavatha, (Colombo: Department of Printing, 1989) Articles 44, 46, 55, 58.

[xx] Chandra R. de Silva and Tessa Bartholomeusz, The Role of the Sangha in the Reconciliation Process, Colombo: Marga Institute, 2001, pp. 17-18.

[xxi] Buddha Sasana Amatyansaya: 1990 Agosthu 20 Sita 22 Dakvaa Kolamba Bandaranaike Anusmarana Jathyanthara Saalawedi Pavathwanalada Buddha Sasana Amathyansaye Karyabharaya Pilibanda Samantranaye Varththva,  ([Colombo]: Department of Government Printing, [1990]) p.2. See also Uttarithara Upadeshaka Mandalaya: Regulations, March 22, 1995.

[xxii] Press reports in August 2000 indicate continued resentment at being shut out of the political process in terms of both information and influence. See, “Thousands of monks protest new constitution@ op. cit. and ANMAT launch protest march and fasting campaign,@ The Island, August 4, 2000.

[xxiii] Dharanagama Kusaladhamma was the Assistant Secretary and Kithiyawela Palitha worked as Treasurer. Murutthettuwe Ananda and Athureliye Rathana were organizers for the JSS.

[xxiv] For an analysis of the proposals see Rohan Edirisinghe, ‘Constitutionalism. Pluralism and Ethnic Conflict:The Need for a New Initiative,’ Creating Peace in Sri Lanka: Civil War and Reconciliation, ed.  Robert I. Rotberg, Cambridge, Mass.: The World Peace Foundation, 1999, pp. 169-187

[xxv] The JSSam is led by a group of active educated monks including Ven. Ellawela Medhananda (President), Ven, Nagoda Amarawansa, Ven. Dharanagama Kusaladhamma, Ven. Akuretiye Nanda and Ven. Athureliye Rathana.

[xxvi] e.g. Public meeting on 11 May at Colombo, procession and meeting on 2 September in Colombo, motorcade from Kalutara to Kandy and meetings along the way, 15-19 September, 2002. See Chandra R. de Silva, ‘Peace in Sri Lanka,’ Asia Pacific Law Review, 2003, forthcoming.

[xxvii] Saroj Pathirana, ‘Ranil blessed by Buddhist Mahanayakas,’ SLNet News Report, 27 April 2002 and Associate Press News Report, 14 May, 2002.

[xxviii] See Chandra R. de Silva, ‘Comment on Ven. Akuretiye Nanda’s paper, An Analysis of Statements Issued by the Mahanayakas on the North-East Problem of Sri Lanka’, International Conference on Buddhism and Conflict in Sri Lanka, Bath Spa University College, Bath UK, 28 June-30 June 2002.

[xxix] See Report by Walter Jayawardhana, Los Angeles, When Malwatte Mahanayaka Thero Suddenly Changed His View of the Tiger De-Ban Everybody Thought Something Was Rotten in the State of Denmark, says Outspoken Scholar Monk, Circulated by Sinhale News in September 2002.

[xxx] “Jata Rupa Rajata Patigghana Veramani Sikkha Padam Samadiyami” which meant, ‘I undertake the precept to refrain from accepting gold or silver.’

[xxxi] de Silva and Bartholomeusz, The Role of the Sangha, op. cit , p. 20.

[xxxii] For more on this see Steven Kemper, The Presence of the Past: Chronicles, Politics and Culture in Sinhala Life, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991.

[xxxiii]It is important to remember that the curriculum in these pirivenas is somewhat different from the traditional training offered to Buddhist monks in pre-colonial times that concentrated on religious texts, languages and grammar but also included medicine, astrology, literature and statecraft (arthasastra). See Abhayarayna Adhikari, Sri Lankawe Sambhavya Adhyapanaya ha Mahasangana (Colombo: S. Godage and Sons, 1991) p. 195.

[xxxiv] Chandra R. de Silva, ‘The (Mis)education of Buddhist Monks in Sri Lanka’ Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the South Eastern Conference of the Association for Asian Studies, January 12-13, 2001.

[xxxv] For a recent analysis of the Education system see Chandra R. de Silva, ‘The Role of Education in the Amelioration of Political Violence in Sri Lanka,’ Creating Peace in Sri Lanka, op. cit., pp. 109-129.

[xxxvi] For examples see de Silva and Bartholomeusz, The Role of the Sangha, op cit., p. 10.

[xxxvii] For a recent analysis see Michael Roberts, ‘The Burden of History: Obstacles to Power Sharing in Sri Lanka,’ Indian Sociology, new series, Vol. 35 (1). Pp. 65-96.

[xxxviii] David Scott, Refashioning Futures: Criticism After Postcoloniality, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999, p.185.

[xxxix] As Scott puts it ‘What this means, in effect, is the establishment of intersecting public spaces – spaces that practice different forms of belonging, in which different self-governing practices can be cultivated in the different languages of identity.’ Scott, op cit. p.189.

[xl] This is what Ananda Abeysekera was aiming at when he suggested that we might “explore how particular debates can enable plural persons, discourses, and practices, standing within and speaking from their respective positions of secular\religious domains, to authorize themselves to come into central view and battle out questions of what constitutes religious identity, pluralism, and difference.”  Ananda Abeysekera, ‘Identity for and Against Itself, Religion: Religion, Criticism and Pluralization,’ Paper read at the Department of History, Old Dominion University, November 15, 2001. I am thankful for comments by Ananda on the first draft of this paper.

 

 

 

Prof. Chandra R. de Silva teaches at Old Dominion University. The paper above was presented at Sri Lanka: Dynamics of Violence, Challenges of Peace, Cornell University, a conference co-hosted by lines magazine.

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