lines co-editor, Vasuki Nesiah
worked on the following Q and As with activist-intellectuals Lionel Bopage,
based in Canberra and Ketheshwaran (Kethesh) Loganathan, based in Colombo. Lionel Bopage is former general secretary of
the JVP and former member of the District Development Council, Galle. Associated
with the JVP since 1968, he resigned in 1984. He is currently a member of
the Executive Committee, Friends for Peace in Sri Lanka, based in
Canberra, Australia. Kethesh Loganathan
is currently Director of the Centre for Policy Alternatives (CPA) and Head of
its Conflict & Peace Analysis Unit. During the 1983 –‘94 period, he was a
member of the EPRLF and partook in the negotiation processes spanning the
Thimpu Peace Talks of 1985 to the Mangala Moonesinghe Parliamentary Select
Committee of 1992. During his involvement in the Tamil national movement as a
member of the EPRLF he did not contest in either the N-E Provincial Councils
elections of 1988 or in the subsequent parliamentary elections of 1989 and 1994.
He resigned from EPRLF in 1995. The
views expressed by him are in his personal capacity.
Kethesh
and Lionel, both found their home in youth militant movements
that fundamentally transformed the political culture of Sri
Lanka – one from the South, and the other from the North.
Within the EPRLF and JVP, they represented voices of
integrity and pluralism that questioned party dogma, resisted
the expedient, and promoted internal democracy – but they also
represent a fundamental commitment to struggle against the social
injustices that birthed these political organizations.
Holding onto both these elements, we approached these
Q and As with an interest in exploring the alternative paths
(lost paths?) that were not taken – a lens into the past that
may shed some light onto the future.
Q&A with Lionel Bopage (Click Here For Full Version)
Q1.
Could you reflect
back on the origins of the JVP and speak to the mood of the sixties and
seventies – perhaps if you could focus on the different social sectors that the
militant movement drew upon, the social tensions within the Sinhala community
that fed this militancy and so on?
I would like to begin my reflections
commencing from the 1950s because the socio-economic and political events
during that period have had serious ramifications for the future generations of
Sri Lanka.
Left
movement and nationalism
The left movement, led by the Communist Party
(CP) and the Lanka Sama Samaja Party (LSSP), was quite influential in early
1950s but was being overtaken by the Buddhist nationalist wave that was rapidly
gathering momentum in the south of the country. The left parties did not clearly understand the dialectical
relationship between the nationalist currents of both Sinhalese and Tamils and
the economic basis of the country.
Also, being preoccupied with
nationalism’s threats to unity
of Lankan social fabric, they could not harness the momentum of the progressive
anti-colonial trends of Sinhala nationalism. .
The left movement was unable to expand their organizational base beyond
the urban working class or to mobilize the working people to form a
revolutionary mass movement.
Mahajana
Eksath Peramuna
The Mahajana Eksath Peramuna (MEP) was able to capture political power in 1956,
by galvanizing only the Sinhalese out of all the social forces colonialism had
subjugated. So much so that, bulk of
the CP cadres had switched to the SLFP by 1956. The galvanized Sinhala Buddhist wave delivered a significant blow
to the hitherto strong left (though divided on international ideological
affiliations), with far-reaching consequences.
The MEP government carried out a campaign of
‘nationalisations’ as pledged during the 1956 election
campaign. It also implemented the
Official Languages Act (Sinhala Only Act) of 1956, gave more opportunities to Sinhala students
to study in their mother tongue.
However, the government did not have a vision or plan to utilize the
skills of the new generation of‘Sinhala only educated’ youth.
This wave also negatively affected the
relationship between the left and the Tamil-speaking people.
Tamil youth gradually shifted their allegiances to the Tamil nationalist
movements and the plantation workers moved away from the trade unions
affiliated with the CP and the LSSP.
Economic
situation
The free education system and the numerical
expansion of university campuses and Sinhala education produced waves of sinhala university graduates from rural areas full of future expectations. All of them, including students of the
faculties of science, agriculture and medicine faced diminished employment
opportunities. In 1968 there were more
than 500,000 unemployed youth looking for jobs.
There was manual work available in rural
areas in agriculture, fishing, plantations, mining, and other fields. However, many graduates were not willing to work as farm hands or workers, which
further aggravated the unemployment situation.
Here the emphasis is deliberately limited to Sinhala speaking youth. The Tamil speaking youth faced a similar set
of problems accentuated by ethnic discrimination.
Movement
The disadvantaged and the underprivileged of
the society had no opportunities to participate in economic and political
decision-making, They became
increasingly frustrated and alienated from the system. This
provided a natural and ideal opportunity for the “movement” (which was
named the JVP at a later stage) to expand its political base.
University students, particularly those from
the rural South, school students becoming aware of their precarious
future with no expectations of employment prospects,
rural youth and the urban poor who were being repressed
and discriminated because
of their background of birth (caste, class, political
allegiance etc.), all provided the JVP its vital growth hormones.
As a result, in contrast to the rather privileged social
status of most of the traditional left leadership, JVP leadership
and membership came from the marginalized rural poor.
The JVP became the harbinger of the message
of social progress and was Marxist in essence.
Rather than believing that their ‘Karma’ is the source
of their helplessness as Buddhism taught, they came to believe
that with their commitment, dedication, and effort they would
be able to initiate and bring about social changes for the better.
The movement supported the successful
campaign of the United Front at the general elections held in 1970. The United Front fought on a strong
anti-imperialist policy platform including the nationalization of colonial big
business enterprises, which was very popular in many developing countries at
that time. Within weeks of coming to
power the leaders of the United Front, in particular, NM Perera, commenced
backtracking on the radical election pledges that were made. As the government discredited itself, the
JVP rapidly grew in popularity. The
public campaign of the JVP worked very well among the rank and file of the
traditional left who had believed in the election pledges of the United
Front. The JVP was gradually expanding
its base not only among the youth but also among workers, peasants and
plantation workers. By the end of 1970,
the JVP had become the strongest left force in Sri Lanka.
Back
Q2(a).
How would you characterize the historical
record of the JVP and its different phases?
The 1971 insurrection was the first major
insurrection of the Sinhala youth against the State since the rebellions of
1818 and 1848 against the British.
I would characterize the JVP as a
semi-proletarian movement of the rural youth, landless peasants, the unemployed
and other oppressed sections of the Sri Lankan society. The main aim of the JVP was achieving social
justice for the oppressed and equitable resource and income distributions. I will now briefly outline the different
phases of the progress of the JVP.
Formation
of the ‘movement’
Nine individuals led by Rohana Wijeweera
formed the movement in May 1965. By the
time Rohana alias Loku Mahaththya was expelled from the CP (Peking wing) he had
laid a strong foundation for building the new movement. The movement had established two
agricultural farms in Hambanthota and Anuradhapura to finance itself. The movement was of the view that it should
arm itself to confront the potential threat of a neo-colonial dictatorial
regime that could have been established by the pro-US elements of the then UNP
government. The movement was able to
establish some contacts within the armed forces. In 1969, it started holding educational camps based in the famous
five lectures.
At the end of 1969 the ‘group twenty one’,
the first central committee of the movement, met. The Mao Youth Front led by GID Dharmasekera was expelled from
the movement in 1970.
The first public event of the JVP was held at
Vidyodaya University in July 1970 and the news organ of the JVP, ‘Janatha
Vimukthi’ came into circulation in August 1970. Since then the JVP started publishing ‘Rathu Balaya’ island-wide,
‘Rathu Lanka’ for the working class, and ‘Rathu Kekulu’ for children. The first public rally was held in Hyde Park
in August 1970.
Pre
1971
In September 1970, in an act of self-defence,
the JVP again decided to arm itself with whatever weapons they could get hold
of. The massive propaganda campaign the
JVP launched in late 1970s, which comprised of island-wide poster campaigns,
selling 50,000 copies of the central party organ ‘Vimukthi’, large public
gatherings and political lectures, led to its rapid expansion,
The expansion did not happen in areas where
Tamils, Muslims and Christians were predominant. The leadership of the JVP consisted mainly of individuals born to
rural Sinhala Buddhist families. The
nationalist militant movements in Tamil areas were in the offing but the JVP
did not have the capability to do its propaganda work in either Tamil or
English. The JVP interpretation of the
class forces leading the socialist revolution would also have made the Tamil
activists hesitant to join the JVP ranks.
By early 1971, the government saw the JVP as
an imminent threat. In fact, after the assassination of a police
officer during a demonstration outside the US Embassy on 6 March
1971 by Mao Youth, JVP was proscribed by the UF government.
The government provided the security forces with full
powers of arbitrary arrest. By the end of March, thousands of
JVP cadres had been in custody. In March, the government implemented the third
part of the emergency regulations empowering the security forces
to dispose of dead bodies without post-mortem examinations or
informing the relatives.
Pre-1971 period of the JVP was also full of
factionalism and splits. Many groups
had moved away from the JVP due to political differences. The group led by Dharmasekera was prominent
in this regard. Despite working
together due to government repression at the end of March, the mistrust between
the two factions was so vast that each faction was taking life and death
precautionary steps to protect their own factions.
1971
Insurrection
It is still debatable whether the 1971 April
insurrection was a short-term plan to capture state power or not. It was an action plan to defend our rights
for political existence. In fact, the
two factions within the JVP apparently adopted two different lines of
action. One faction proposed that going
into immediate offensive was the best defense, which had been the ideological
position of the JVP. The other faction
was concentrating more on getting Rohana Wijeweera out of detention using all
available means.
In hindsight, I believe that our opposition
to the inhuman state activities to search and destroy JVP members could have
taken other forms, forms that could have led to mass agitations and protests
against the government repression.
JVP’s original decision to arm itself, in self-defence, generated a
vicious spiral of violence.
During the insurrection, the UF government
introduced repressive labour laws and arrested all those who did not report to
work. Hundreds of JVP cadres
sacrificed their lives in combat and non-combat situations, and thousands were
arrested and destroyed by security personnel.
After capture, some were burnt alive, buried alive and some were cut to
pieces using chain saws. Even some of
those who surrendered following the call of the then Prime Minister Mrs
Bandaranaike were killed. Despite subsequent denials, in later weeks, hundred
of bodies of young men and women were seen floating down the Kelani river near
Colombo, where they were collected and burnt by soldiers. Many were found to have been shot in the
back.
1971-1983
The pre-1971 period dominated by ultra-left
adventurist tendencies of the JVP was replaced, after 1972, with a more
balanced approach. The period of 1971
to 1972 was a period of reflection on the past policies and practices of the
JVP. The prison life enabled different
political thoughts and currents to be forged into a new thinking of the
JVP. Dropping the entire political
lecture on Indian expansionism, revision of the political lecture on ‘the path
of the Lankan revolution’ with less emphasis on military aspects, complete
moving away from the sectarian political influences, development of policy
frameworks in the form of a policy declaration, study of the national question
and bringing it to the fore in political agenda, emphasis on organization of
the urban and rural proletariat were some changes that worth mentioning.
The second wave of public rebuilding of the
JVP began in 1976 and after November 1977 when all political prisoners
sentenced under the Criminal Justice Commissions (CJC) Act were released with
the then UNP government repealing the Act.
The JVP gradually moved towards limiting itself to parliamentary forms
of struggle.
Between 1971 and 1983 the JVP recognized, in
principle, the right of nations to self-determination accepting it as based on
Leninism. However, it continuously
rejected agitating for the rights of non-Sinhala people. In the face of discrimination and repression
against the Tamil people the Central Committee remained deadly silent. At the beginning of 1983 there was no difference
between what the JVP was advocating and what an orthodox parliamentary party
would have been advocating on the national question.
The JVP also rejected to establish dialogue
with any of the Tamil militant organizations.
In 1983, even without such a dialogue, the JVP was accused of having
ties with the Tamil militancy! I feel
that the JVP could expect to rally the Tamil people around the banner of
revolution if and only if the party identified with the problems of the Tamil
people simultaneously with those of the Sinhala and other peoples and agitated
forcefully demanding solutions to their problems.
Initially, in 1977, there was general
agreement to take united action, forming alliances on specific issues and
working on a united action program with other left parties. However, by 1983 this tendency had become minimal. .
1984-1990
In July 1983 by concocting a conspiracy, the
UNP government proscribed the JVP and drove it underground. While the old left kept silent, several civilian
organizations and breakaway left parties and groups demanded
lifting of the proscription of the JVP.
In 1985, the JVP decided to build an underground organization
and to use the national problem to its advantage.
Instead of relying on people power, in late
1985, they had based their hopes on their armed strength. The vicious cycle had just begun. Daya Pathirana, leader of the Colombo
University independent student union movement was assassinated at the end of
1986. The security forces, its
paramilitary units, and vigilante groups such as green tigers, PRAA, Black
cats, Yellow cats and Ukussa (Eagle) had commenced assassinating the
JVPers. Many JVPers and civilians
disappeared after arrest. In response,
The JVP, in 1987, had established its military wing ‘Deshpremi Janatha
Vyaparaya’ (DJV) which had carried concentrated attacks out on selected
security targets. The JVP terror
campaign in earnest appeared to have begun in 1987, with the DJV decision to
declare curfew and kill civilians who do not abide by its orders.
Meanwhile the government sponsored July ‘83
pogrom against the Tamils had exacerbated
the Tamil militancy in the north-east which by then has become a full scale
civil war. In mid 1987 India air
dropped supplies over the north east.
to prevent a full-scale invasion
of the Jaffna Peninsula by the Sri Lankan State. 1986 saw the formation of ‘Mavubima Surekeeme Vyaparaya’ led by
the JVP, denoting a major shift towards anti-Indian rhetoric.
The Signing of Indo-Sri Lanka Accord in July
1987 had been used by the JVP and chauvinist forces to make rural Sinhala youth
indignant against the government and to arouse anti-Indian sentiments.
Apparently, the five lectures had been redrafted to reflect the new thinking of
the JVP. The
lecture, Indian expansionism had been revived giving it a new lease of
life. The JVP had proposed a national
liberation government under a national liberation united front. The new JVP slogans were anti-Accord and an
anti-Indian. Accusing JR Jayawardena of
betraying the motherland, the JVP had started appealing to nationalist
sentiments to liberate the motherland and accused everybody else being agents
of “Indian imperialism”. Selling and
buying Indian goods, wearing Indian sarees, and consuming Bombay onions, Masoor dhal etc. had been banned.
The JVP had started assassinating not only
the UNPers, but also the SLFPers and the supporters of the United Socialist
Alliance. Vijaya Kumaranatuga was
killed in early 1988. Government
politicians maintained torture chambers island wide with the assistance and
involvement of the top brass of the security forces. Thousands had been taken to these chambers, tortured, maimed, and
killed. In the meanwhile, the LTTE
withdrew from the Accord, the IPKF guns were aimed at the LTTE. India formed Tamil National Army (TNA) to
fight against the LTTE. Massacre of
Sinhala civilians by the LTTE became advantageous to the JVP. By late 1988, people in the south were under
the dual power of the UNP government and the JVP mini-government. Rate of killings by both sides had reached a
daily figure of hundred, at the time the highest in the globe.
In December 1988 at the presidential
elections, instead of appealing to people to express their will by voting at
the provincial council elections against the repressive regime, the JVP used
violence to prevent people from casting their votes. The JVP election strategy overlapped with the election strategy
of the repressive regime. Having come
to power President R Premadasa lifted the emergency, freed detainees and asked
the JVP to engage in main stream politics.
It was too late. The state
repression, police death threats and fear psychology would have prevented the
JVP leaders from coming to the open.
The JVP who drew immense popular support in rural areas shifted its
slogans, in July 1989, giving emphasis to driving the Indians out. However, the JVP activities, such as
curfews, transport strikes lack of opportunities to get health care, food and
children’s education started affecting the ordinary working people rather than
of the rich. People were forced to take
strike action under death threats.
Subjected to unmentionable torture, captured
JVPers had provided information on the whereabouts of the JVP leadership. Rohana had been taken into custody in
November 1989 and assassinated the same evening. The UNP gained military victory by killing about 80,000 people.
I feel that the JVP should have negotiated
with the government between 1984 and 1987.
The JVP violence provided the government with justification of its
massive terror campaign. In a way this
may be interpreted a return to pre-1971 politics. Nevertheless, there were major differences. Similarities were that they used Indian
expansionism as the ideological front to fight the regime. They fell into a similar trap of relying on
arms rather than on people. The
differences are that in 1971 the JVP was demanding the UF government to
implement the election pledges of the UF government and to carry our economic
reforms that benefited working people.
However, in 1988-89 the demand was for the government not to implement a
proposed bourgeois democratic solution to the national problem, which the UNP
had pledged in its 1977 election.
Modern
JVP
Having embraced adventurism at the end of
1980s the JVP has commenced since 1990s oscillating back to traversing the
right wing route. It has now made a
major shift towards class collaboration with the bourgeois leadership of the
PA, thus taking a comparable route traversed by the old left in the 1960s. The JVP agitates claiming that Sri Lanka's
territorial integrity, unitary state, national independence and sovereignty are
in grave danger. They want to defeat
separatism and stop division of the country militarily and ideologically. They oppose negotiations with the LTTE
unless they drop the demand for separation and disarmed, which is politically
equivalent to a complete surrender.
Worst is their statement that there was and
is no ethnic problem in Sri Lanka!
With regard to the national question they have joined
hands with Sinhala chauvinist groups.
Condemnation of terror by the JVP is one-sided.
While condemning the terror campaigns conducted by the
LTTE, they praise the terror campaigns conducted by the security
forces as patriotic. They
emphasize that there are favorable conditions worldwide to eradicate
terrorism. This indirectly
implies is that Sri Lankan government should invite US-led terror
coalition to eradicate the LTTE.
.
The JVP has moved away from Marxism-Leninism
without publicly acknowledging it.
Instead of demanding the capitalist state to grant rights
of the working people, at least for the express purpose of exposing
the incapability of the capitalist regimes to do so, the JVP
tells people to wait until their ‘savior’ acquires power to
bring them heaven. It
does not wish to make a self-critical appraisal of its past
and is competing with the old left to cover up the responsibility
of the capitalist regimes for the current political situation
and in the process covers up the real current state of affairs.
Back
Q2(b).
How was the
political landscape of contemporary Sri Lankan politics shaped by youth
militancy of the JVP?
Some have argued that the 1971 insurrection
helped to reinforce the security apparatus of the capitalist state. I agree.
The security apparatus has been expanded both quantitatively and
qualitatively. Now one can find hundred
thousands in the forces with technically superior land, sea and air
equipment. In addition, since 1971
until recent times, the governments have continuously used emergency
regulations to curtail dissent among Sinhala and Tamil populations.
The failed insurrection made the United Front
(UF) government to introduce minor reforms such as land reform, nationalization
of several business ventures, and implementing some economic self-reliance
measures. People’s Committees were
established but the people constituted only the supporters of the UF
government! These half-baked measures
did not at all represent a realization of the aspirations of the Sinhala youth
who rose up in April 1971.
I should mention here that the 1971
insurrection and the post 1971 JVP activities had negligible influence on the
radicalization of Tamil youth. The
Tamil people as a whole did not play any part in the insurrection.
I would say the
so-called low caste people in the south were inspired, to a certain extent, by
the militancy of the JVP. In other words, the existing caste oppression in the
south did encourage the oppressed to join the JVP, as the oppressed Tamils in
the north willingly joined the LTTE.
In
hindsight, one could raise the question: Was it worth paying such an exorbitant
human and economic cost to achieve social changes? I have no direct answer to this question rather than to say that
the answer depends on how one looks at it.
When people rise up for their rights they do not do so based on a
cost-benefit analysis!
Back
Q3.
Could you highlight
the issues around which there were key debates/divisions within the JVP
regarding alternative paths? What were
the key-registers of internal debate?
Key debates within
the JVP came to a peak while we were behind bars, after the 1971
insurrection. These debates were on
issues such as the failure of the 1971 insurrection, modes of armed struggle,
Indian expansionism, and Marxist ideology.
The prisons had been converted into ‘university colleges’ where the
majority of political prisoners had been engaged in debates mainly of
constructive nature. However, the JVP
activists imprisoned at Hammond Hill, Jaffna had apparently maintained a
virtual prison within the state prison by carrying out constant threats and
physical attacks on their political adversaries. .
Politics and militarisation
The debate on
politics and militarisation of the JVP had not been carried through to its
conclusion. The Leninist position of
relying on peoples’ power to meet state repression and the position of relying
on arms and military strength has many strands. Working class leadership is the important factor in this formula. Military strength only complements its struggle
when it is appropriate and necessary.
Emphasis and reliance should have been on peoples’ power rather than on
the strength of arms. The JVP could
have explored other options available for defending its political rights. For example, leading of everyday struggles
of the working people while exposing the treachery of the bourgeois aligned
traditional left, united action of groups interested on a minimum program of
protecting democratic rights, and peaceful protest campaigns for raising
awareness could have been useful tactics.
Party and class
History is not an automatic
mechanical process that inevitably brings socialism at the end
of capitalism. The party
and the class do not exist in a vacuum, but in an environment
of spontaneous activity of working people, constant counter-revolutionary
threats, massive psychological warfare, lack of resources, internal
divisions, and agent provocateurs and destabilisers planted
within. These factors
severely affected the JVP and became more isolated in an increasingly
hostile environment. In
these circumstances, the party degenerated into making a series
of substitutions, the party substituting itself for the working
people, the central committee (CC) substituting itself for the
party, and the leader substituting for the Politburo (PB) and
the CC. The JVP had
neither discussed nor understood the dialectical relationship
between the party and the class properly.
Before and during the insurrection the JVP had been acting
as the perceived ‘working class’, putting itself in the place
of the working class, the very same process that led to the
degeneration of the Bolshevik party of Lenin into the bureaucracy
of Stalin.
National problem
At the Magazine
Prison, Rohana and I discussed the necessity of drafting a policy
declaration. We agreed to do this as a
joint exercise. In the meantime, I was
taken to Bogambara prison for two weeks, where I had the opportunity to talk to
the Tamil youth long detained under the Emergency Regulations, for raising
black flags against the 1972 Constitution drafted by Colvin R de Silva. Santhathiar and others who were among the
youth had already exchanged views on matters relating to the JVP, the CJC
trial, and the problems in the south.
This discussion laid the foundation of my future research work on the
national problem, the results of which had been confirmed in reality by my
extensive political experience in the north and east. Back at the Magazine Prison, Rohana and I discussed and agreed
for the further need to incorporate policy frameworks addressing the problems
of the Tamil people. The task of
drafting an article fell with me and this article later became the basis of the
JVP policy framework on the national problem.
This framework was incorporated in the policy declaration and in a
booklet on the national problem, published by the JVP as a ‘Niyamuwa’
Publication.
Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA)
A major debate in
post-1977 JVP was on how to react to the PTA introduced by the UNP government
in 1981. The UNP attempted to sell the
PTA that it would be used against Tamils only, not against the Sinhalese.
When I raised this
issue at the PB and proposed the need for initiating united action against the
PTA, it was sad to see that the strongest opposition to my suggestion came from
Rohana and the effort to build united
action around the issue of PTA did not move far. Rural population versus
urban population
In Sri Lanka, The other debate centered around the
question who are the proletariat in Sri Lanka? The left in the 1950sconcluded that the closest we could get in terms of
the Marxist definition of the proletariat in Sri Lanka was the Plantation
working class. In the 1970s, the
political consciousness of the plantation workers remained extremely low in
spite of their long association with left trade unions. After their disenfranchisement, , the left
did not show any more interest in organizing them.
On the other hand,
the urban workers are not proletarians in the strict sense of
the word. Other than their jobs, they have many things
to lose. Many of them
enjoy capitalist property relations both in rural and urban
areas. Some have their own non-urban properties that generate profits for
them. Some of them lend
money and earn profits. For
work, many travel from villages to the city.
They have strong kinship links in rural Sri Lanka.
In this sense, the capitalist alienation of urban workers
is not complete, but they sell their lab our for a living and
their activities can easily acquire organized nature.
Also in the fifties the influence of nationalism had
permeated through the ranks of once militant left trade unions.
Having gone through a long process of degeneration, they
seem to fight only for economic demands.
There had been and there are exemptions to the norm of
these generalizations, of course!
Back
Q4.
Looking back with
the benefit of hindsight, what were the critical turning points that may have
charted a different course for militant left politics today?
The earliest turning
point I can recall was the break-away (or the expulsion) of
the group led by G I. D Dharmasekera from Rohana’s movement. The split was on the question of the military
strategy of the Sri Lankan revolution. Rohana took the position that any future attack should be simultaneous,
dispersed, and short term.
Dharmasekera espoused a “base camp” theory, relying on
concentrated and long term offensives as practiced in the Chinese
revolution and awakening people with gunshots as practiced in
the Cuban revolution. Each side had made many allegations against
the other. For example,
Dharmasekera alleged that Rohana’s movement was advocating an
overnight revolution. Rohana’s movement clearly pointed out the reasons
why base camps and long-term offensives have not been advocated. The factors considered included the possibility
of successful use of modern technology such as air power and
armour ed vehicles to surround and destroy base camps, and lack
of rear support bases for carrying out a sustained long term
struggle. The examples of rear support bases cited included
the Soviet Union in the case of China, the Soviet Union, and
China in the case of Vietnam.
Publicity campaign, personality cult and divisions
The decision to
launch massive publicity campaigns, I believe, was a turning point that led to
the disastrous situation that the party was in 1982 and 1983. After our release from prison in November
1977, the PB of the JVP adopted Rohana’s proposal to carry out gigantic
publicity campaigns that dealt with propaganda strategy rather than
policy. He was thinking of launching
mass public rallies wave after wave. I
expressed my reservations on this proposition on the ground that such a
campaign lacking a concrete dialectical relationship with the JVP
organizational work would compel it to “eat more than it could digest. The campaign led to the next logical step of
raising the personal profile of a few JVP leaders. Vas Tilekaratne had put this proposition at the PB and Mahinda
Pathirana at the CC. The JVP then
decided to contest the Colombo Municipal Council elections. I raised my concerns about the dangers that
could be associated with this decision.
Again, I agreed with the majority decision. For the first time photographs of several leaders started
appearing on JVP poster campaigns.
Raising the ugly head of personality cult within the JVP and blind
personal allegiance were clearly visible in its future political activity. Members and sympathizers of the party
treated the activists with different responsibilities differently.
Back
Q5.
How would you
analyze the failure of those fighting for ethnic justice and economic justice
to conjoin their struggles?
In a more general
sense, the nationalist waves of the south and the north were interdependent but
did not take place in a synchronized manner.
There was a marked lag between the phases of the two waves. Although the possibility of using one
nationalist wave to counter the other nationalist wave did exist, the use of
such possibilities ultimately ended up in reinforcing both nationalist
waves. This has been amply demonstrated
by the events relating to the conflict in Sri Lanka that occurred in the
pre-1956 period, around Bandaranaike-Chelvanayagam Pact period, around
Dudley-Chelvanayagam Pact period and around Indo-Sri Lankan Accord period. One noticeable feature of the post 1995
period under the foreign policy of the former PA government, was to use
sections of Sinhala diaspora to counter the support extended to the Tamil
militancy by sections of Tamil diaspora.
This process resulted in building almost total barriers between
communities of diverse Sri Lankan ethnic origins and even among people of the
same ethnic origin but having diverse political views on the conflict.
Justice and war
The left in the
south has not taken this situation to their advantage either due to their own
culpability, their political opportunism, or their incapacity. Some left groups are so weak that they
cannot take advantage of the situation.
The JVP with Sinhala chauvinism on their side has taken an extremely
dangerous opportunistic position, which may end up either the country being
permanently divided into two or the country being driven into economic
ruins. The JVP’s argument that the
Tamil militancy needs to be eliminated militarily, which is not justifiable by
any Marxist standard, is very hard to achieve in reality. In a military sense, if the mightiest arms
producers like Israel with its wholehearted support and warmest blessings of
the United States cannot prevent the weakest forces like stone-throwing
Palestinian kids, it is hilarious, to say the minimum, to propose Sri Lanka
could militarily eliminate Tamil militancy, without ruining its entire
economy. I am not justifying here the
human and political rights violations carried out by the Tamil militants
including the LTTE but it must be seen as an unfortunate by-product of the
festering national problem.
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Q6.
Today bitterness and
distrust within the Sinhalese left which appears to be as deep
as that between Tamils and the Sri Lankan government - what
are the prospects for addressing these issues?
Does it suggest that the left has been too ready to fracture
about hair splitting ideological divides, too intolerant of
internal differences?
I wish to commence
by looking at the current socio-economic and political situation of the
country.
Socio-economics
Despite economic liberalization
and privatization, industrial structure provided by free trade
zones, a swelling service sector, modern farming practices and
increasing integration with the process of capitalist globalization,
Sri Lanka remains a backward, underdeveloped or developing capitalist
country. The gap between the rich and the poor has widened.
Working people are finding it very difficult to survive
with what they are been paid for their lab our. Unemployment is on the rise. Deep penetration of finance capital in Sri
Lanka and its wide-ranging economic, political and social links
have provided a fertile ground for the spread of decadent bourgeois
culture dominated by cronyism, bribery and corruption.
Burden of a future war launched against the Tamil militancy
will be squarely placed again on the shoulders of the working
people. Feudal remnants such as family bandyism, land
bondage relationships, national, religious and caste oppression
continues to inhibit even the liberal capitalistic development.
The record of
capitalist governments of Sri Lanka has demonstrated their inability to find
solutions to the problems of the working people. They have not even been able to fulfil the remaining bourgeois
democratic tasks. Only the organized
working class will be able to counter the worsening crisis driven by the
neo-liberalist agenda.
Urgent task
The urgent task of
the left today is to initiate a process to include diverse progressive
views into a coherent strategy and a minimum program of social
change. The left forces need to adopt a less dogmatic,
less sectarian approach with more tolerance towards new social
thinking and developments and their critical assimilation. Sri Lankan left needs to unite all those who are adversely affected
by the neo-liberal agenda under one banner, i.e., ‘people before
profits’. Given the
mistrust that exists between diverse left formations it would
be impossible, in practice, to bring all those formations under
one umbrella. The left
in the south needs to establish political links with progressive
formations and individuals in the north and east and to develop
international collaboration with forces opposing neo-liberalist
globalization agenda. This
may initially take the form of a loose alliance that may be
strengthened by taking confidence building measures among the
elements of the alliance. Such
an alliance could provide the basis for building an extensive
island-wide mass movement based on a broad political agenda
that would focus on issues immediately affecting the working
people.
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Q7.
If we were today
trying to reflect back on traditions of dissent and emancipation in the JVP to
inspire a more democratic and inclusive path for the future – which are the
movements – or who are the individuals – you would highlight?
This is a complex
and hard question. Having paid only
short visits to Sri Lanka in recent years, it is difficult for me to grasp
ground political realities there, in particular, of diverse parties and
formations.
However, I know that
there are thousands and thousands who are stranded like me without knowing
where to start, where to go and whom to believe, scattered all around Sri Lanka
and elsewhere. They have learnt ample
lessons from their past experiences both within and without the JVP. There are many who having formed diverse
political groups and formations have not at all succeeded in moving
forward. In fact, they have
disintegrated and marginalized themselves by their own approaches. The JVP with its deviations seems to have
moved a long way.
I have a strong
belief. A belief, that one day, when
the JVP hits its next crisis point in their sinusoidal path, honest and
committed people in their ranks, when they come to know the reality of the
deceptive politics their leadership had engaged in, would join hands with
others in forming a better organization, as the young generation of the 1960s
did, when the traditional left departed from their mission and formed a
bourgeois coalition.
My only wish is that
that day will be not so far away!
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