Peace
Process, the People and Civil Society
J
ayadeva Uyangoda
Introduction
While the UNF government and the LTTE are engaged in an exercise
of cease-fire and negotiation, there is a great deal of interest
in this process and its outcome among the people in general and
civil society activists in particular. Some politicians in the
previous as well as the present government have often appealed
to 'civil society' for its support for the peace process. Meanwhile,
civil society activists have been busy in organizing meetings,
rallies, conferences, workshops, vigils and meditation campaigns
in support of the present peace drive. There are also others who
are cynical about these efforts and even make fun of them. The
question however remains whether there is a distinct role for
the civil society in conflict resolution and if so why. This issue
has not yet been adequately discussed or theorized in Sri Lanka's
civil society politics. This essay is an attempt to provoke a
discussion towards such theorization.
People's Participation in Peace?
As an entry to the discussion on the role of civil society in
the present peace process in Sri Lanka, it would be useful to
examine another related issue, the role of people, or citizens,
in peace building. In conditions of war and violence, people are
usually victims and onlookers. People may occasionally get a direct
role in the conflict when they are provoked into participate in
that dreadful practice called ethnic riots, which have now become
events meticulously organized by ethnic leaders-turned riot entrepreneurs.
With the inauguration of a peace process, different, positive
dynamics set in. People begin to entertain hopes and expectations
about life and future. When killings stop, at least temporarily
as it has in consequent to the present ceasefire agreement between
the government and the LTTE, people also begin to be positive
about life. How can such hopes, expectations and enthusiasm for
peace and life among the people be channeled into a positive force
for peace building? Sri Lanka's civil society groups committed
to the peace process need to grapple with this challenge.
Is people's involvement necessary for the success of a peace
process? Do people really have a role to pay in creating peace
in a protracted conflict? One response to these questions is "no."
Or else to say that people do have a role, but it quite limited
and insignificant. Prime examples of this limited role assigned
to the people in a peace process are voting in favor of political
parties that include peace in their political-electoral agendas
and giving support and legitimacy to peace agreements once they
are signed. In this 'support paradigm', the citizens' role is
limited to supporting peace actors, supporting peace process and
supporting its outcome. Even then, it is a role allocated for
an outsider.
Interestingly, this approach of treating the people as an outsider
to the peace process is the dominant perspective in the theory
and practice of contemporary conflict management and resolution.
We may call this 'leader-actor centric approach to peace.' It
is based on a set of influential assumptions which we must critique.
It assumes that managing violent, protracted and deadly conflicts
is the exclusive and primary task of the leaders of direct parties
to the conflict. If we illustrate this point by referring to Sri
Lanka's case, the sole responsibility of resolving the conflict
is with the government and the LTTE. And the two sides also believe
in that assumption. Indeed, as experience in many protracted conflicts
has demonstrated, this is not the most effective approach to brining
protracted, deadly conflicts to a peaceful end. Peace agreements
negotiated and signed by the top leaders of the two sides are
a necessary, but not adequate precondition to peace in protracted
armed conflicts. Only people's participation in the peace process
can make agreements work and fruitful in restoring peace in a
lasting and sustainable manner.
The leader-actor centric approach to peace presupposes negotiation
and third-party, often international, mediation. This is also
based on a set of assumptions. One of its key assumptions is linked
to the concept of 'Peace Deal' which has its origins in the 'Realist"
paradigm of the theory of international politics. Indeed, much
of the contemporary negotiation theory are influenced by the realist
and behavioral assumptions of the international politics. The
'realist' understanding of world politics posits the political
world as one existing in a general ambiance of anarchy, in the
sense that there is no global authority to maintain law and order
in a world made of nation-state units that are concerned with
their own, individual 'national interests.' The behavior of each
political actor is governed by security concerns; steps taken
by one actor to secure its own security generates insecurity in
others. In the Realist language, this situation is called 'security
dilemmas.' Living in a world of anarchy and insecurity, the best
strategy for political actors is to work towards a mutually agreed
balance of power. In striking a balance of power, the leaders
are called upon to 'negotiate.' They are also called upon to make
sacrifices and effect trade-offs in a framework of cooperation,
or win-win perspective. The agreement thus reached is a 'Peace
Deal' that will incorporate measures to address security dilemmas
of the parties in conflict. They are known as security and political
guarantees. To enable the parties to work out the deal and ensure
its future implementation, the involvement of an outside force
is acknowledged in the concept of 'international mediation.' Peace-keeping
and peace enforcement are also strategies available for the third
party to ensure that parties honor peace deals.
Another significant assumption in the leader-centric approach
to peace is the belief that 'peace is the absence of war.' This
is the 'negative peace' paradigm that is also present in the peace
deal approach. Parties enter a peace deal not necessarily to address
the root causes of the conflict, but to suspend hostilities and
manage the war through mutually acceptable guarantees. It doesn't
rely itself much on building new relationships or addressing issues
of identity, justice, and distribution of power so that peace
would mean not only the absence of war, but also the presence
of conditions that makes war unnecessary.
In such a 'realist' approach to peace, there is hardly any direct,
proactive role for either the civil society forces or the people
in general. Their expected role is a reactive one. The work expected
from civil society groups includes assisting reconstruction and
rehabilitation work undertaken by the government and the international
humanitarian agencies, implementation of social service programs,
assisting people in situations of complex emergencies, in some
situations organizing elections as well as election monitoring.
These are also elements of the global peace agenda in the post-cold
war world. In the slightly more inclusive liberal peace agenda,
domestic civil society groups are still conceived as secondary
and even subservient to the direct actors to the conflict and
the representatives of international political and donor communities.
This situation calls upon the democratic civil society constituencies
to work towards a goal of positive peace, as opposed to negative
peace, and towards transformative peace that should transcend
the limits of the peace deal.
Transformative Peace
A program of transformative peace should not reject the agenda
of negotiation, mediation and peace deal. Rather, it will place
them in a broader and comprehensive process of peace building.
In transformative peace, conflict is not rejected as a negative
force. What it will reject is the violence, war and destructive
dynamics and consequences of deadly and protracted conflicts.
From a transformatory perspective, the existence of an intractable,
violent conflict is clear indication that radical socio-economic
and political reforms are necessary to address both the causes
and consequences of conflict. If we take Sri Lanka's own example,
there is no possibility of returning to old, 'normal' politics,
if the ethnic conflict is to be effectively managed or resolved.
It at the minimum requires reconstructing the state and its structures
and revising the constitutional foundations of the state. It is
only through such a transformatory reform program that a secessionist
ethnic community cam be invited back to the fold of a reformed
state.
For lasting peace in Sri Lanka through resolving major issues
involved in the ethnic conflict, political reforms alone are not
adequate. 'Reconciliation' as theorized recent discussions on
peace building is essential to complement an institutional-structural
reform agenda. As a direct consequence of the protracted and violent
ethnic conflict, Sri Lanka's society and polity are deeply divided,
acutely fragmented and incalculably atomized. Ethnic and even
religious communities fear, suspect and deeply mistrust each other.
There are political and ideological groups that seek to spread
the politics of intolerance and hatred and they eagerly await
the failure of the present negotiation process to strike. As Sri
Lanka's recent experience tells us, peace agreements that further
intensify existing divisions have little or no chance work. Nor
will they make any positive sense if they are made amidst and
atmosphere of the politics of intolerance and hatred. Professor
John Paul Lederach's wise words are quite apt: "Contemporary
conflicts demand innovation, the development of ideas and possibilities
that go beyond the negotiation of substantial interests and issues."
Although trust-building and reconciliation are essential pre-conditions
for building lasting and sustainable peace in deeply divided societies
like Sri Lanka, the agenda of trust and reconciliation cannot,
and should not, be assigned to ruling parties and guerilla movements
that have only other day thrived on community mistrust and polarization
as well as violence.
Building trust and deepening reconciliation in societies caught
up with intractable ethnic conflicts involves a political and
ideological struggle that should be waged with commitment, sophistication
and resources. It is a common experience in many plural societies
with ethnic conflicts to cope with political and ideological movements
that advocate and reinforce identity intolerance, racist militarism,
and political authoritarianism. They deny the legitimacy and relevance
of pluralism, multi-culturalism and tolerance that provide the
normative-programmatic foundations for lasting peace. They are
also quick to make alliance with 'predatory social formations'
and 'spoilers' that emerge in societies in protracted armed conflict.
They wait for setbacks to the peace process in order to mobilize
social groups and classes that may have other, mostly economic,
grievances against the government that has enters into a peace
deal with the 'enemy.' Usually, government's have neither strategies
nor capacity to politically deal with such politico-ideological
forces. They could either subject these forces to bloody repression
as the UNP regime did in 1987-89, or capitulate before them as
the PA government did most recently. Democratic civil society
forces can do a better job in meeting the threat of these political
and ideological forces of militarism, racism and reaction. But
it requires strategizing the process of peace building, reconciliation,
consciousness raising, political education, networking, resource
mobilization, and strategic intervention. It also requires assuming
the politico-theoretical leadership for change, reform and reconstruction.
Strategizing Transformative Peace
Once we recognize the importance of transformtive peace, our
next step would be to propel a transformative peace agenda into
an agenda of political action and intervention. In order to map
out the framework and stages of such a strategy, democratic civil
society groups must initiate a fresh political discussion without
delay. There is no harm to recognize the theoretical limitations
of the present civil society debate in Sri Lanka on peace. The
realist as well as liberal peace agendas are accepted by many
civil society activists without subjecting them to adequate political
or theoretical scrutiny. Elements of transformatory peace are
mentioned in the debate, yet they are couched in an essentially
liberal political discourse that has limited value for emancipatory
politics. The excessive attention given by some liberal peace
constituencies on issues of process, legality and individual rights
has already run into conflict with those who advocate group rights,
self-determination and substantive, as opposed to procedural,
democracy. The point in Sri Lanka is that the political and theoretical
implications of these contradictory positions and debates are
not adequately pursued. Advocates of each approach appear to believe
in the absolute correctness of their positions that may not be
the case if their subjected to the test of emancipatory political
strategizing.
In order to provoke some discussion on this important issue,
let me make a few points.
(i). It is the responsibility of the democratic civil society
to take the present peace process away from its present state-centric
and actor-centric framework. For the peace process to be made
inclusive and truly emancipatory, it is necessary to pluralize
and democratic its actors and communities of stakeholders.
(ii). There is the crucial need to widen the terms of debate
on peace, to liberate it from its 'realist', 'pragmatic' and partisan
limitations, as preferred by the government, the LTTE and the
international community. Visions of democratization, human rights,
social and community justice, pluralism and multi-culturalism
and accountability should be brought to the center of the political
debate and agenda on peace. Peace should be an inclusive process,
and not a series of events between the government and the LTTE.
(iii). It is extremely important that the question of reconstructing
the Sri Lankan state and politics is brought to the transformatory
agenda. An effective resolution of ethnic grievances requires
the broadening of the constitutional foundations of the state
in a creative and imaginative manner while securing public support
and legitimacy for a radical reform program entailed in such an
effort. The question of autonomy and self-determination, the question
of the rights of local minorities in a regime of regional autonomy,
the issue of ethno-territorial bases of power sharing, the challenge
of dealing with secession in political and constitutional terms
in a period of transition from civil war to post-civil war are
some key issues that require a great deal of innovation in political
and legal theory. Political parties, regimes and guerilla movements
are not the best institutions to grapple with such complex issues.
(iv). For lasting peace, it needs to be made sustainable. Sustainability
in this instance would mean that the peace process will have the
institutional, ideological and resource capacity to go forward
on its own. In other words, the peace process should have self-sustaining
capacity. In contemporary approaches to peace building, the idea
of building 'infrastructure for peace' means exactly that. It
involves building middle-level negotiations and networks, peace,
trust and reconciliation among communities, dialogue for peace
among identity groups, building a culture of non-violent conflict/dispute
resolution and transformative peace education.
(v). The 'Realist' peace process constantly runs the risk of
its breaking down either while the negotiations are on or when
the settlement agreement - the 'Peace Deal' - is being implemented.
Indeed, peace agreements are, while being attempts at resolving
contradictions, also embodiments of contradictions which are not
always amenable to easy resolution. Who will pick up the pieces
when the peace process breaks down? It should not be the forces
of racism, militarism and intolerance. Even amidst setbacks, who
will resurrect and carry the peace process forward? A weak and
dispirited peace constituency may not be in a position to undertake
that task.
--March 31, 2002
______________________________________________________________
Jayadeva Uyangoda is Associate Professor of Political
Science in the University of Colombo, Sri Lanka.
HOME
