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The Emerging Sinhala Chauvinist State -- Ahilan Kadirgamar
For those standing for Tamil rights, democracy, and dissent this is nothing new - - their project has always been one to fight the dual forces of repression. But before a discussion of the resistance against Sinhala chauvinism and Tamil fascism, it may be useful to take a bird's eye view of the nearly six decades of majoritarian politics and the resistance it engendered in post-colonial Sri Lanka. The early decades of independent Ceylon compelled Tamil activists to confront what was quickly becoming a Sinhala State, with the disenfranchisement of Hill Country Tamils, the attacks on the Left, and the initiation of colonization in Tamil areas. The demand for federalism and non-violent agitation was a call by the centrist Tamil camp for accommodation in the aftermath of the Sinhala only act of 1956. The Southern polity, however, failed to accommodate Tamil aspirations through federalism, and the resulting escalation of discrimination and violence led to the rise of Tamil militancy two decades later in the mid-seventies. By the mid-eighties - a mere ten years later - the Tamil experiments in armed struggle had become a disaster, taking a huge civilian toll and leading to a humanitarian crisis at the hands of a repressive and militarized State. Moreover, armed struggle also saw the decimation of alternative voices in the Tamil community by the LTTE's exertion of fascist politics. The two decades from the mid-eighties to the current peace process - except for a brief lull during the peace talks of the mid-nineties - was a time of war: military repression by the state and the continuing elimination of dissent by the LTTE. As the possibility of a negotiated solution waned in the twenty years of war, both the State and Tamil resistance were progressively militarized and the LTTE consolidated its fascist ideology. The LTTE showed zero tolerance for dissent and also initiated ethnic cleansing against minorities, particularly Muslims in the North and East. For its part, the State standing on Sinhala chauvinist ideology continued not only a project of military invasion but it also refused to consider any meaningful devolution. The consolidation of these ideologies, Sinhala chauvinism and Tamil fascism, mirrored and fed on each other, effectively obliterating the possibility of a negotiated solution. The ideological project of Tamil rights, democracy and dissent (albeit among marginalized and disparate groups and individuals in the Tamil community) was an attempt to articulate an opposition to the ideologies of Sinhala chauvinism and Tamil fascism in favor of a negotiated solution that met Tamil aspirations through the devolution of power along with democratization and the protection of human rights. Such a project of Tamil dissent saw that the ideologies of Sinhala chauvinism and Tamil fascism were, in fact, objective allies that relied upon, and guaranteed, each other's survival. It is in this ideological and historical context, and after a military stalemate between the State and the LTTE, that the current ceasefire was sealed. The peace process and ensuing negotiations shared one major characteristic with the war years: the further marginalization of the project of Tamil rights, democracy and dissent. In fact, the primary project of the LTTE during the three and a half year period of the ceasefire has been a war on Tamil dissent. The State and the international community have tolerated this agenda in the name of peace by commission or omission. If one were to compare the current ceasefire to other ceasefire periods, there are alarming similarities and differences. The ceasefire in 1990 initiated by Premadasa led to mass round ups of Tamil dissenters by the LTTE and that too with the clear complicity of the State. However, the ceasefire initiated by Chandrika in 1994 was starkly different from the current ceasefire in that she came with the support of a large Tamil constituency for peace, not to mention support from civil society in the South. That Tamil peace constituency consisted of public support, activists willing to engage with the South, and even Tamil parliamentarians. In attempting to legitimize the LTTE's claim to "sole representation", however, the current ceasefire has pushed Tamil dissent underground, if not buried it alive. In that context, the role played by Tamils who surfaced in support of the Chandrika government and her peace efforts have to be scrutinized. Lakshman Kadirgamar, Neelan Thiruchelvam and a number of other Tamil politicians made the daunting step in attempting to reach out to a State that had severely alienated Tamils during the UNP regime from 1977 to 1994. That courage to engage with a majoritarian State, even at the risk of being branded a traitor and targeted, is something that needs to be interrogated so as to understand the character of the Sri Lankan State. As with all the other peace processes, the LTTE restarted the war in 1995, perhaps this time because of its wavering control over the Tamil population. The government responded with a 'war for peace' as it called it, a strategy of attempting to defeat the LTTE militarily while pushing for a political solution in the South. However, the political solution met the same resistance in the South that the war efforts met in the North. The progressive proposals of August 1995 were slowly watered down and version after version of the devolution package got weaker. As if destroying the peace agenda by watering down wasn't enough, the UNP (the parliamentary opposition at that time) burned the draft constitution in parliament. This is a history we all know all too well, but what happened to those Tamils that chose to engage with the State? Neelan Thiruchelvam, the architect of that constitution, was himself assassinated by a suicide bomber in 1999. And a few weeks back, LTTE assassins cut short the life of Lakshman Kadirgamar. While tribute after tribute on Lakshman Kadirgamar has been flowing from every corner of the globe, it is also important to assess his political career critically. The war years saw Kadirgamar as an apologist for some of the unacceptable policies of the State. In his quest to rein in the LTTE, he also whitewashed the human rights violations of the State. He certainly did not campaign for Tamil aspirations within Lanka with the same passion that he campaigned for the ban of the LTTE internationally. Therefore, his courage I would say was not during the war years, when it was easy to join the anti-LTTE and "anti-terrorist" bandwagon, but rather during the last two years of the ceasefire, which were marred by assassinations of marginalized Tamils, recruitment of thousands of children and attacks on the democratic rights of Tamils. When the Southern establishment joined the "peace at any cost" bandwagon, Kadirgamar had the courage to challenge the State's accommodation of the LTTE's claim to "sole representation", and the abdication of its democratic grounding and the rights of its Tamil citizens that this entailed. The emerging Sinhala chauvinist State, while paying lip service to protecting Tamil rights or meeting Tamil aspirations, used the few Tamils that came to work with it for the instrumental end of defeating the LTTE. The Southern polity will not or does not want to understand that no Tamil can sincerely and securely participate in governance or other functions of the State without the recognition of Tamil aspirations. While the LTTE assassinated individuals like Thiruchelvam and Kadirgamar, the State ensured that such Tamils could not play any meaningful role. The reluctance to move on addressing Tamil aspirations was also a lethal betrayal of those Tamils that took the risk of working with the State to reform its majoritarian legacy. In its present trajectory, the emerging Sinhala chauvinist State is getting rid of the Tamil residue that is a part of it. Consciously or unconsciously, the State is cleansing itself of Tamils. Both Presidential candidates are moving in the direction of entrenching a Sinhala chauvinist State. Wickramasinghe believes that the only meaningful devolution of power is to assure the LTTE's power over the North and East in return for the guarantee of stability and security. The Rajapakse / JVP campaign refuses to consider a meaningful political solution based on devolution, claiming that it would only legitimize and strengthen the LTTE. In other words, for both candidates the LTTE remains the only point of reference when addressing the Tamil national question. Even as tensions within the SLFP point to other possible trajectories, the main thrust from the major Southern parties is one that refuses to consider coexistence with the Tamils through the devolution of power. The LTTE has ensured its privileged position with the South and the international community as being a force to reckon with, through its only effective argument: the "threat of war." Tamil dissent, which has paid the most costly price during the three and half year ceasefire with over three hundred political killings, may very well be safer during a time of war. But the LTTE holds the ordinary people of the North and East hostage to a war they cannot afford. Tamil dissent, even at a price of decimation, will have to call for a negotiated solution. Those who threaten war make it clear as to who really is on the side of the Tamil people. As mentioned earlier, Sinhala chauvinist ideology led to the birth
of, and continues to sustain, a fascist Tamil ideology. Similarly,
the emerging Sinhala chauvinist State will become the rationale for
an emerging Tamil fascist State. Every step not taken to move on a
federal political solution that fulfills Tamil and Muslim aspirations
will be a step towards alienating Tamils and building a separate Tamil
State. This dialectic of the emerging Sinhala chauvinist and Tamil
fascist States, are perhaps of most concern to the Tamil and Muslim
people of Sri Lanka, large sections of which will be caught between
these two States. Moreover, the emergence of repressive states does
not bode well for social justice or democratization in Sri Lanka as
a whole. To use the language of war, the project of Tamil rights,
democracy and dissent will now be to fight a war on two fronts against
the emergence of two repressive States. And this politics of resistance
will require alliances with progressives in the Muslim and Sinhala
communities. |