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Peace Talks: Whereto from Here -- S. Nanthikeasn
Peace should be a transformative process. Sustainable peace is not about replacing one hegemony with another. It is about progressing towards a just society – a society that is free of oppression not only along the axis of ethnic lines but also along other social, political and economic dimensions. Gender and caste are some of the other social dimensions where drastic action is needed in Sri Lanka. As pointed out in many previous lines editorials, to ensure a just society, political democracy must be accompanied by radical restructuring of economic decision-making. It is clear that there is very little agreement among the various actors - from the LTTE to the GOSL to ordinary folks. Political questions, such as what is fair and fairness for whom are critical for sustainable peace and continue to be debated in the public sphere.
The road to peace has many forks. One of the paths that seemed popular among NGOs and the previous government was an approach that focuses primarily on the strategy and management of negotiations. This approach focuses on sustaining the negotiations through strategically sequencing the negotiation priorities to provide a foundation of irreversible forward momentum before commencing negotiations on ‘difficult’ political issues. Skeptics contest this view and insist that negotiations must be grounded on politics. They argue that if the negotiations were to be meaningful, fundamental questions of social justice must first be taken on, even though they could derail the process,
There are lessons to be learned from our experience with both approaches. The strategy of UNF government resulted in an outcome similar to the first approach – Certainly not because they had this strategy all mapped out, but because their version of racism was quite compatible with throwing the North and the East to the dogs (literally) as long as the ceasefire would allow the UNF to run their business in rest of the country. It is true that the prolonged absence of war did make war much more difficult. However, as many had pointed out, turning a blind eye to social justice issues in the name of safeguarding the peace process had come at a cost of relentless elimination of dissent and space for democracy in the North and East.
Entering directly into negotiations of core issues did not prove to be a spectacular success either (e.g. the short lived peace process in 1995). Negotiating from a narrow partisan view of social justice is a ticket to failure – the LTTE in 1995 or JVP (and LTTE) at present, are cases in point.
Clearly, learning from our mistakes, bringing in a vision of social justice that encompasses all in a strategic sequence seems necessary. Rather than “talking about talks” (see lines editorial August 2002), experimenting with strategic sequences that fully recognize the contextual hierarchy of core issues would have been an alternative way to travel.[1]
Not that any talks stands a chance with the LTTE. But there are die-hard optimists who assure us that LTTE does not have a monopoly on intransigence and there is global competition – they tell us that groups that were as intransigent had turned around and come to the negotiating table. Whether we believe the optimists or not, those who are committed to political solution will have to live with the risk of failure. Such an approach, however, faces another risk. When we take on core issues in a piecemeal manner, we also compromise on our vision of social justice in the interim. For instance, if human rights issues were the last in the agenda, we have little control over human rights violations until we complete the negotiations. What makes this approach less unpalatable than the peaceniks’ call for peace process at any cost during UNF time?
A difference can be made if a) we have a concrete vision[2] and commitment to a society we wish to see; and b) navigate ourselves using this vision as our compass at every turn. Without this compass, the goals of social justice are deferred to an unspecified distant future that must await the completion of the peace process. The spotlight is removed from the concrete vision of the society we wish to bring about and shifted to sustaining the peace process. The need for peace is delinked from its social roots and peace process becomes an exclusive game of the political elite who call the shots.
Fundamental changes are necessary for attaining social justice. We subscribe to the idea that to bring about such changes every step we take must work towards institutional changes that chip away social injustices. This is the vision/approach that is presented in many of our editorials (see for instance, the November 2003 editorial of Vasuki and Nanthikesan for an exposition of this approach in regard to ISGA)[3]. In the Sri Lankan context, this is a useful exercise to deepen the politics of various actors - be it conflict resolution-walas, peaceniks, the GOSL, the LTTE, or the Left. In this context, I wish to discuss the links between peace process, democratic changes and the recent split in the LTTE.
The split within the LTTE in March 2004 took everyone by surprise. My interest here is not pinning down the real reasons behind the split. Whether it was prompted by an internal power struggle or by the rampant corruption in the LTTE rank and file in the East or by the systematic marginalization of the East by the LTTE hierarchy, the split opened up possibilities. The dissidents cited the persistent marginalization of the East within the LTTE as the reason for the split. The ensuing debates and activities provided an opportunity for the entire Tamil community in the East to highlight generations of marginalization by the North and the rest of the country – From Sir P. Ramanathan to the Federal party to the present, the Eastern Tamils[4] lag their Northern counterparts in terms of opportunities and access to education, and administrative, political and economic power, etc. Decades of resentment among the ‘upper strata’ of the society (read traders and educated classes) regarding the Northern hegemony resonated with the dissident LTTE wing’s (LTTE-D) call for ending discriminatory practices against Eastern cadres within the LTTE. [5] The dissent provided the catalyst and opportunity for the community at large to come forward with their grievances. This does not mean that people took to the streets en masse in support of the LTTE-D. Their expression of support was of course tempered by the past record of the leadership of the LTTE-D, and the uncertainty of the situation.
The open dissent within LTTE’s military ranks and the decision of the dissident LTTE wing (LTTE-D) to stay in the East and defend itself created for a brief period, a ‘protected’ space for democratic expressions that was unparalleled during the decade of militant control- there were signs of civil society support/participation (particularly from the eastern academia and traders). The dissent, while it lasted, offered a glimmer of hope for democratic space in the East not only for the Tamils but also for the Muslims. We say this despite the fact that the leaders of the LTTE-D were directly implicated in the massacre of the Muslims (in addition to his possible involvement in the Kathankudy massacre of Muslims is being, Karuna is also renowned for his anti-muslim positions[6]) and were responsible for years of forcible child recruitment. We say this because to face the wrath of the LTTE and survive as a viable force in the East, there was a strategic need for the LTTE-D to mend their ways and rely on broad based support.
How did the GOSL respond to this rare opportunity in the East? On the positive side, it made it quite clear that it will not attempt to take military advantage of the situation. That is highly commendable. Time and time again we have learned that seeking a military solution to the conflict is futile.
However, the initiatives during peace process should also strengthen the efforts towards social justice. If it was clear to the GOSL that peace will put a sizeable segment of the Eastern population at the mercy of armed few, then it needs to act to enhance the democratic space while ensuring peace. The response of GOSL on this score was rather weak. Instead of sticking to the peace accord religiously, it had no clear strategy. On the one hand, it allowed the LTTE to bring its forces through sea (Ahilan’s lines editorial February 2004) and failed to prevent (or at least firmly resist) the transportation of LTTE troops from the North into Mutur area (that is contiguous to Vaharai area). On the other hand, it also appears to have aided the escape of Karuna from the region.
The current GOSL recognizes the futility of expecting LTTE to ensure a pluralistic democracy in the East. Yet it failed to seize this opportunity to act in multiple fronts. In fact, as pointed out in the November 2003 editorial, the only force in the parliament that took a stand to support the democratic aspirations of the Tamils in the East (as well as the Muslims and the Sinhalese) was the sinhala chauvinist group, JHS!
If the GOSL had had a vision of broad-based social justice, what steps could it have taken? First, GOSL should have supported the efforts of LTTE-D to become a political force within the region. This it could have achieved by strictly enforcing the peace accord and preventing LTTE troop movements within the area. The LTTE asserts that LTTE-D is a matter of internal discipline. Clearly this is not the only possible interpretation. Should that be the case then LTTE itself should be treated as a discipline issue for the GOSL rather than a negotiation partner. Supporting an independent political movement in the East, amounts to requesting the LTTE to cede control of the East – i.e., separate the East from the NorthEast. First of all, LTTE would not have been in a position to take on both, the military and the LTTE-D at the same time. In any event, foregoing this opportunity is just the same as signing off the democratic future of the Eastern folks for a number of years to come.
Second, GOSL could have pursued a highly visible deterrent course of action against political killings perpetrated by both LTTE factions – this would have had positive effects not only within the East but outside as well. The spate of recent killings appear to go well beyond the factional fight and LTTE targets seem to include other dissenters living outside LTTE areas of control[7]– for instance, the recent killing of senior EPDP member, Iyer. Current efforts by the GOSL to combat this are restricted to issuing statements condemning the violence that seem to have zero effect on the ongoing LTTE’s assault on dissent all around the country. Even these namby pamby protests are few and far apart. We observed the shocking silence of the GOSL when its own minister was targeted by a suicide bomber. Tamil activists who have had safe haven in various parts of the country now live in sheer terror while the spate of killings continues unabated. We continue to see the lasting damage that the State and JVP terror of the late 80s (and early 90s) have inflicted in terms of the capacity to mobilize civil society as a democratic force in the rural south. The LTTE’s current move to terrorize the handful of Tamil dissenters outside its areas of control is likely to create a vacuum in the sphere of democratic activism. And in the long term, will inhibit the democratic future of the North and East.
Third, by abandoning the East, the GOSL became responsible for the reintroduction of forcible recruitment of children. As the recent UN report points out, LTTE continues to re-recruit its diminished forces in the East, wiping out all the gains made when LTTE-D decided to release all its child soldiers.
Presumably, the GOSL fully understood the consequences of its actions. Yet, once again it chose not to jeopardize the peace process by sacrificing issues that are fundamental to human security and social justice. Should this be treated as an inevitable either/or question, i.e. peace or social justice? Are there alternative ways to learn by looking at our past experience and our immediate priorities to strategize how we sequence the core issues in our negotiation agenda? Is it possible at all to start by chewing what we can bite, by negotiating the issues of political and economic rights of children and adults alike?
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- [1] In the negotiations between the indigenous Muslim rebel group MILF, and the Government of Philippines where the issues to be negotiated started with economic and social rights, and will be moving onto ancestral domains even though the broader political arrangements are still pending. [2] By concrete vision I do not refer to a blue print for the future society that does not recognize the dynamics of the changes that ongoing struggle brings about. We refer to a clarity and commitment to broad democratic values and institutions at the minimum. [3] http://www.lines-magazine.org/Art_Nov03/Editorial.htm
[4] This is not to say that the Eastern Muslims were treated fairly by the Northern Tamil political and military formations. Indeed we have covered in many articles how the Muslims were marginalized (see for instance, Bazeer’s article in November2003 lines issue; http://www.lines-magazine.org/Art_Nov03/Bazeer.htm
[5] In his letter to Prabhakaran of 2nd March 2004 and in the subsequent leaflet, Karuna pointed out that the East has seen nothing but misery and economic ruin and the parents will no longer tolerate Eastern cadres being exported to the North for menial duties where they are given no modern skills or opportunities for advancement. In subsequent public statements he claimed that East has lost over 5000 cadres and could show nothing for its heroic sacrifices.
[6] See UTHR Bulletin #36 http://www.uthr.org/bulletins/Bul36.htm
[7] Dissenters within LTTE controlled area are, needless to say,
at the top of endangered species list- rare exceptions do exist, as
the recent exchange between the LTTE and Gurunagar fisherfolks indicate. |