Realities and representations: The Failures
of the Oslo Process
-- Raif Zreik
What might explain the difference in the attitude of the international
media between the first Intifada in the eighties and the recent
Intifada? Why was there relatively more sympathy with the Palestinians
in the first Intifada? My short answer is that while the first
Intifada was conceived as an act against occupation the last one
was conceived as an act of violence against peace. While the first
one was understood to be spontaneously initiated by an occupied
people, the second Intifada was conceived as an act of violence
conducted by a state, so while the first was mainly understood
as an act of liberation, the second was partly conceived as an
act of aggression.
My claim here is that this was a misconception. The reality between
the two Intifadas has remained a reality of occupation; only the
representations, the images, the vocabularies and the rhetoric
have changed. This paper aims to trace the reasons for this misconception
and to explain how and why that happened.
My claim here is that the Oslo accords, in principle, have contained
all the seeds of the collapse of the process, and that they have
merely postponed the outbreak of violence. Here I will outline
some comments to clarify my argument.
1. Process and Substance
The Oslo process was not grounded in any normative standards
to test its substantive results. There was no reference to concepts
of justice, international norms, and/or an objective referee;
the process was a mere reflection of the imbalance of power. In
contrast to most contemporary decolonalization cases it was not
clear where this process was leading to, or what would provide
normative standards for the outcome of that process. It is true
that UN resolution 242 is mentioned, but each side has its own
interpretation of that resolution. The accords don’t commit Israel
to total withdrawal from all of the occupied territories, and
even worse it did not include any commitment from Israel to stop
its settlement building policy.
The imbalance of power between the two parties was exacerbated
due to the fact that there was no honest “referee”. The process
was not lead by an international body such as the U.N. Rather,
it was under the American umbrella. In this context the Israeli
interpretation was adopted for every controversial question; the
stronger side was able to impose its understandings.
2. The lack of reciprocity
The accord that some thought to be reciprocal and mutual, was
in fact very much one sided. While the P.L.O has recognized Israel
and its right to exist –in the name of all Palestinians- Israel
did not recognize the right of Palestinians to their own state
in the occupied territories of 1967, neither did they recognize
any of the other Palestinian rights recognized in the U.N resolutions;
instead Israel simply recognized the P.L.O as a representative
of the Palestinian people – entity capable of recognizing Israel.
The result of this exchange of process with substance and tools
with content was disastrous for the Palestinians. The real meaning
of this imbalance is that the Palestinians recognize the Israeli
border of 1967, while at the same time Israel itself is not committed
to those borders. So during the negotiation, the 1967 borders
were only “borders” that constrained Palestinians demands, without
imposing any limits on Israeli territorial demands. So while Israel
achieved its basic goal by signing the Oslo accords, tPalestinian
goals are on hold awaiting the unfolding process
This asymmetrical situation has created a reality where the issue
under discussion is the fate of the territories occupied in 1967.
This is the cake that is to be divided between the two. While
any reasonable solution needs to be established on dividing the
whole land, ‘historical Palestine’, between the two people, the
Oslo framework has created a mental framework where what needs
to be divided is the occupied territories itself, and not the
whole historical Palestine. The structure of the accords has portrayed
the West Bank and Gaza as disputed territories between Israel
and a projected Palestine, and that each party has his own legitimate
claims to this land.
Under such understanding the Palestinians were represented as
stubborn, uncompromising, insisting that they have “all” of the
1967 occupied territories, and not willing to reach a compromise
i.e.: to agree to the continuation of the occupation. The fact
that the Palestinians had already made their historical compromise
by signing the agreement and by giving up 78% of their homeland
was simply overlooked. The earlier concessions of the Palestinians
where not counted when the two sides reached the final status
issues in Camp David in summer 2000. In contrast to this response
to the Palestinian’s simple demand of ending occupation, the Israeli
demands were treated as quite ‘moderate’ by the western media
– Isreali demands included, the demand to annex territories, control
water, establish borders that crossed roads and settlements …
the upside-down understanding that would label these demands as
‘moderate’ would not have been possible had the Palestinians been
able to condition their recognition of Israel with Israel recognition
of their full right in the whole of the 1967 occupied territories.
3. The dynamics of sovereignty
The accords established the Palestinian Authority (PA) to control
the Palestinian population. In fact the PA has the authority over
the Palestinian people but not over the land. Thus under Oslo
Israel was able to continue to confiscate Palestinian lands, to
build new settlements, to use water recourses in the west bank
and Gaza, and to initiate bypassing roads, as if there was no
Palestinian authority at all; for all these purposes Israel acted
as the ultimate sovereign over the territories, acting unilaterally
without the consent of the PA. Still when the Palestinian population
resisted these actions and went out to the street to protest against
it, Israel has asked the PA to suppress these actions of protest
and held the PA responsible for these actions.
In fact this meant that Israel continues to be the real sovereign
over the land without bearing responsibilities of a sovereign
toward its population. At the same time the PA lacked any real
control over land and other sovereign powers; however, it was
asked to act against its own population as if it was the sovereign.
To add to the complexity of the situation one should recall that
in fact the PLO was melted, but as we saw the PA was not a real
state. So the Palestinians were left without either a liberation
movement (PLO) or statehood. According to the Oslo accords the
PA is responsible for taking criminal actions against Palestinians
who act against the settlers, or simply put, the PA is responsible
for protecting the settlements. But with the collapse of the PLO
into the PA, the Palestinians were expecting that the PA would
continue their project of liberation, and that included, above
all the dismantling of the settlements. Here we see the contradictory
situation of the PA as a liberation movement in the eyes of its
own people, while also being a subcontractor for Israeli security,
while also being an element of stability within the frame of Oslo
and as an element of instability for the liberation movement.
4. Words and their meanings
Under Oslo and between the years 1993-2000 the number of settlers
in the occupied territories has more than doubled, while the standard
of living in the territories has declined by 30%. The de-facto
situation was that Israel has replaced the old explicit occupation
with rather new remote control occupation, so that the occupation
would become invisible. The mere existence of the PA gave an image
of relations between two states. Here a mutual interest has emerged
between the Israeli occupation and some elites in the PA; both
wanted to present Oslo as a real achievement. Internationally,
the PA adopted some of the outer trappings of statehood, issuing
stamps and radio stations with officials calling themselves ministers
etc.- all of these have created the illusion of ending the occupation
and a sense of post conflict agenda. However, the fact was that
all the real issues remained unresolved (borders, settlements,
refugees and Jerusalem). In fact, the PA have created the impression
that they would accept any deal that is offered to them; such
assessment was based on the fact that since Oslo Israel has doubled
the number of settlements and the PA has continued to negotiate
without any real crises.
In many ways Oslo has rendered the occupation invisible and as
such its resistance almost impossible in the conventional methods
of the first intifada. The presence of the PA and the so-called
“peace talks” has created a total misconception of reality at
all levels, the Palestinian level, the Israeli level and as result
in the international level. The Palestinians, the majority of
whom supported the Oslo accords, have become very bitter and disappointed
with the achievements of the process, this is partly because their
hopes had no basis in the letters of the Oslo accords. On the
Israeli side, the Israeli peace movement has almost completely
disappeared after Oslo under the impression that they had won
and that we are already living in the post-conflict era. The international
media (whose governments were interested in imposing a solution
that would close the Palestinian file) have participated in the
celebration of the peace talks without asking hard questions about
what is really going on and how peace was achieved without minimum
justice.
When the last intifada erupted the Palestinian found that they
had lost the vocabularies to address public opinion and they had
partly lost the clear image of the occupied. Their homeland has
been fragmented and the occupation has been rendered invisible.
While in the first intifada it was clear that every stone was
being thrown as a protest against the occupation, this was not
the case in the second intifada. Acts acquire there meaning against
a certain background condition within which they are performed.
As such, against the background of “peace talks” and the presence
of the PA, the Palestinian act of resistance was partly understood
as an act against peace not an act against occupation. Because
there was already an established Palestinian authority to represent
the Palestinian aspiration, the Palestinian resistance was understood
as an act of aggression not as an act of liberation. Because the
occupation was only remote control occupation without immediate
contact, the Palestinians had to remove the field of clashes into
the Israeli territories as a response to the cruelty of the Israeli
occupation As a result of all these the Israelis and the Palestinians
had to pay a very heavy price.
The Oslo framework has created an alternative understanding of
reality that has lead the Palestinians into an impasse .The Palestinians
have renounced terrorism in the beginning of the process without
a clear definition of what that means, and without answering the
question about what kind of resistance to occupation is legitimate
and under what circumstances. The Oslo framework naturalizes the
Israeli occupation under the vague rhetoric of “peace talks”,
“peace” meant stability, being quiet, and that meant keeping the
status quo i.e. the occupation. Thus occupation was naturalized,
while resistance to this reality was understood as illegitimate
and terroristic (I am not referring here to suicide bombers).
In this situation the whole field of meanings needs to be reconstructed
and words should reclaim their meanings. Peace is the result of
achieving freedom and independence not a precondition for political
negotiation; it is not legitimate to ask the Palestinian to naturalize
occupation and to delegitimize their rejection to the occupation.
Raif Zreik is an SJD candidate at Harvard Law School. He can
be reached at rzriek@harvard.edu
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